South China/West Philippine Sea

[maxiev]

They're selling us again the idea of reviving the Southeast-Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) or a larger Pan-Asian equivalent.

 

http://asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/Geopolitico/Anders-Corr-China-threat-requires-an-Asian-NATO

 

I have a different idea.

 

"The only way to eliminate an enemy is to make him your friend."

Hmmm....how are we supposed to make friends with a country that's claiming that what legally belongs to us actually belongs to them based on some ancient map or some distorted interpretation of history?

 

I think the only way we can make China our friend is to relinquish all our claims to the South China Sea. That's something I don't think is going to happen any time soon.

[sonnyt111]

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/david-vs-goliath-the-south-china-sea-the-philippines-vs-11534

David vs. Goliath in the South China Sea: The Philippines vs. China

Richard Javad HeydarianOctober 23, 2014In a dramatic display of strategic naiveté, the Philippines decided (early-October) to suspend the repair and upgrade of its age-old airstrip on the Spratly island of Thitu (Pagasa to the Filipinos), among the biggest and most prized land features in the South China Sea, which can generate its own 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The airstrip is critical to the Armed Forces of Philippines’ (AFP) ability to project power and defend its maritime claims beyond its immediate territorial waters.

 

For years, the Philippines has not fielded even a single modern fighter aircraft; South Korea is expected to deliver twelve FA 50 lead-in fighter jets (worth $415.7 million) in the coming years, while the Philippine Navy has gradually beefed up its miniscule, antiquated fleet. Thanks to the strategic foresight of the late Filipino dictator Ferdinand Marcos (1966-1986), who recognized the importance of establishing permanent, defensible structures over contested features in the South China Sea, the Philippines has managed to exercise effective and continuous sovereignty over the island, which hosts a permanent civilian community and boasts its own mayor. But the advantage has been slipping away.

 

Manila tried to justify the controversial move by emphasizing the (supposed) importance of maintaining “the moral high ground” amid the country’s pending legal complaint, at a special Arbitral Tribunal in The Hague, against China’s expansive maritime claims, as well as increasingly aggressive posturing within the Philippines’ 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In short, the Philippines has prioritized an inherently uncertain legal maneuver at the expense of investing in tangible mechanisms, which can actually protect the areas under its control.

 

Meanwhile, Manila and Washington have faced renewed legal and political obstacles to the implementation of the recently concluded Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which seeks to upgrade the U.S.-Philippine military alliance amid rising Chinese assertiveness. Other claimant states, from Vietnam to Taiwan, have accelerated their efforts at fortifying their position in Asia’s emerging maritime battlefront. Even nonclaimant states, such as Indonesia, have stepped up their efforts to counter what they see as a “real threat” (from China) to their maritime domain.

 

Strategic Innocence

 

As Jay Batongbacal, a leading maritime expert in the Philippines, recently told me, the Philippines’ case at The Hague, contrary to the position of some Filipino officials, “is not a slam dunk”. China has consistently refused to recognize the jurisdiction of any international body over territorial delimitation and sovereignty-related issues. No wonder, Beijing has adamantly rejected the whole arbitration process, accusing the Philippines of unnecessarily provoking a crisis by internationalizing what it sees as an essentially bilateral territorial dispute, which should be resolved primarily through diplomatic channels.

 

With China boycotting the whole arbitration process, and refusing to even clarify the exact coordinates of its notorious “nine-dash-line” doctrine, it is far from certain whether the Philippines can expect an expeditious, conclusive adjudication, which could tangibly support its claims in the South China Sea. Even if the Philippines manages to secure a favorable legal outcome, China can simply ignore it. After all, the arbitral tribunal is neither designed to conclusively settle sovereignty-related issues, nor does it possess a compliant-enforcement mechanism to ensure the proper implementation of its final decisions. Ultimately, China is more interested in de facto—rather than de jure—domination of the Western Pacific, which it treats as its natural backyard.

 

At best, a favorable outcome would simply enhance the Philippines’ “moral case” against a rising maritime power—China (which has, so far, withstood external diplomatic pressure on issues that it considers “core interests,” from the maritime disputes in the Western Pacific to the intensifying anti-Beijing movements in Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Taiwan and Tibet).

 

In a nutshell, the Philippines’ legal strategy makes sense so long as it is part and parcel of a broader strategy to protect the country’s maritime claims amid China’s day-to-day operations aimed at changing facts on the ground. Theoretically, it would have been best if the Philippines leveraged the threat of filing a legal complaint—rather than actually filing it—to bring China to the negotiating table, or, alternatively, jointly submitted its case along with like-minded states, such as Vietnam. But the legal maneuver has effectively become the Philippines’ primary weapon against an increasingly militarized maritime dispute with China.

 

Since the end of Cold War, the Philippines has been progressively overshadowed by its rivals across the disputed waters. As the former Philippine national security advisor Roilo Golez recently told me, “[For long] the AFP concentrated too much on internal security…[but] the security environment changed in the 1990s. The leadership should have seen China’s move towards the South China Sea [earlier].” Efforts at modernizing the AFP fell short of addressing the emerging threat within the Philippines’ EEZ, because as Golez points out, newly allocated funds “were [channeled to] minor items like field communications equipment, and night vision equipment,” rather than “ the procurement of big ticket items like multirole fighters and Navy assets”, which are crucial to maritime defense.

 

Catch Up Time

 

The Philippines has sought to compensate for its vulnerability, which became patently obvious after China wrested control of the Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef in 1994, by inviting U.S. forces back to the country. The United States dramatically reduced its military presence after the termination of the U.S.-Philippine Military Bases Agreement in 1991. China wasted no time exploiting the temporary power vacuum that the departure of American forces from Subic and Clark bases in the Philippines created. The Obama administration, however, has refused to clarify whether Washington will come to the rescue of the Philippines if a war with China erupts over the disputed features.

 

Meanwhile, the two allies have struggled to fully upgrade their military alliance, since constitutional restriction over the establishment of permanent U.S. military bases in the country have prevented the immediate implementation of the EDCA, which is ostensibly designed to enhance the Philippines’ minimum deterrence capability against China’s maritime designs. In recent days, U.S.-Philippine relations have been tested by the public outrage over the alleged killing of a Filipino citizen by a U.S. Marine. The incident has rekindled age-old concerns over criminal abuses by foreign troops. Nationalist figures and movements have also stepped up their opposition to what they see as a violation of Philippine sovereignty by the presence of American troops on Philippine soil. Leading Senators such as Miriam Defensor-Santiago have called for the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) to be scrapped, while others have called for a review of the bilateral agreement. Criminal jurisdiction continues to be a sensitive political issue in the Philippines, since the 1998 VFA stipulates that the host country does not have full jurisdiction over criminal cases involving American troops. The alleged killer is currently in the custody of American authorities (aboard the warship USS Peleliu) in Subic, who have sought to dampen the political fallout of the incident by promising a full and thorough investigation.

 

With China stepping up its construction activities—having built a military airstrip across the Woody Island (Paracels) and building a similar facility on the Fiery Cross (Spratly)—other rival claimant states, including Taiwan, have fortified their position. For instance, Taiwan is building a $100 million port on Itu Abu (Tai Ping to Taiwanese), which already has a well-maintained military airstrip. The new port, expected to finish by 2015, could accommodate coast guard cutters and heavy naval frigates. Taiwan is also upgrading the airstrip to accommodate its Hercules C-130 transport planes, while finishing an ambitious project of surveying the entire South China Sea through high-resolution satellite imagery. This would give Taiwan a more complete picture of the developments across disputed features, providing valuable intelligence for legal and military contingencies.

 

Unlike the Philippines, practically all other South China Sea claimant states have maintained robust, high-level dialogue with Beijing. Chinese president Xi Jinping has yet to hold a formal dialogue with his Filipino counterpart, Benigno Aquino, who is entering his final years in office. And there are no signs that such an event will take place anytime soon. Interestingly though, Japan, a major strategic partner of the Philippines, has vigorously pushed for a dialogue between Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Xi. Reports suggest that Abe has agreed to acknowledge the disputed nature of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea in order to secure a historic meeting with the Chinese leader. The Philippines will carefully follow the Abe-Xi meeting, since any rapprochement between the two Asian powers could have implications for the Philippines’ efforts to secure maximum external support against China.

 

To resolve the recent oil-rig crisis, Vietnam engaged in a proactive diplomatic offensive, culminating in the visit of Vietnam’s Politburo member Le Hong Anh to Beijing in late-August. Since then, bilateral tensions have subsided, with both countries seeking to enhance existing crisis-management mechanisms to avoid a similar crisis in the future. Back in 2012, the foreign ministries of both countries established a hotline, which covers a comprehensive set of issues including maritime disputes. In 2013, Vietnam’s Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and China's Ministry of Agriculture also set up a hotline to prevent risks and disputes concerning fishery resources. Most recently, the two countries, according to Vietnamese officials, have also agreed to establish a hotline between their defense ministries. Based on recent conversations with a Vietnamese diplomat, it is clear that the real challenge is to operationalize these mechanisms during an actual crisis: during the mid-2014 oil-rig crisis, which sparked huge protests across Vietnam and brought the two Communist countries dangerously close to an armed conflict, there was limited utilization of the existing hotlines. It remains to be seen how the new reported hotline between the two defense ministries will prevent a similar crisis, but it is clear that Vietnam is committed to using all possible diplomatic instruments to avoid another major showdown with China.

 

With its recent acquisition of two Russian-made, state-of-the-art Kilo-class submarines, Vietnam has also beefed up its minimum deterrence capabilities. Hanoi has also welcomed Washington’s decision to relax existing restrictions on arms exports to Vietnam, which could aid Vietnam’s efforts at developing its civilian law-enforcement capabilities.

 

Given the expansive nature of Chinese maritime claims and paramilitary patrols, Indonesia has also accelerated its efforts at streamlining its maritime policy, under a proposed Sea Security Agency (Bakamla), while expanding defense spending to transform the country into a “global maritime nexus.” Indonesia, which has openly criticized China’s “nine-dash-line” doctrine, is heavily concerned with Beijing’s posturing near the hydrocarbon-rich Natuna Islands.

 

Overall, it is clear that China’s rivals in the Western Pacific have hedged their bets by rapidly developing their maritime capabilities, while astutely maintaining critical diplomatic channels with the leadership in Beijing. The Philippines, meanwhile, seems to have placed almost all of its strategic eggs in the (uncertain) legal basket.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

[oscartamaguchiblackface]

http://www.usnews.co...obal-superpower

 

China's Long Road to Superpower Status

 

China lacks the political, economic and civil freedoms to become a world leader.

 

By Jonathan AdelmanNov. 10, 2014 | 12:00 a.m. EST+ MoreIn the last decade, the notion of China becoming the world's next superpower has become almost an idee fixe for many. Compared to the other so-called BRICS – Brazil, Russia and India – China shines like the moon. Since Deng Xiaoping created the Four Modernizations in 1978, China has surged from being a marginal player on the global stage to a powerhouse that has attracted $2 trillion of foreign direct investment.

 

Its economy ranks first in the world in building modern infrastructure, global exports ($2.2 trillion), Internet usage (600 million people), college graduates (7 million per year), rate of economic growth (10 percent from 1980 to 2010), movement of peasants to the city (400 million from 1980 to 2013), high-speed rail under construction (40,000 miles) and major airports (43). By 2025, it will likely have the world's largest gross national product.

Politically, the United States had the world's first democratic government in 1789 and expanded the franchise ever since. By contrast, after 65 years in power, the Chinese communist government has not even begun to make the transition towards a semi-democratic state. Rather, the government, whose think tanks in the 1990s used to talk of managing a democratic transition, has cracked down on movements in minority areas and in Hong Kong. There are no democratic elections at any level. Without this transition, the People's Republic of China faces the serious possibility of falling apart like the Soviet Union did in 1991.

 

Economically, while the United States has a strong, relatively open capitalist economy, Chinese economic freedom is so poor that the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom ranks China 137th in the world alongside Cameroon and Tajikistan. As a result, the Conference Board, citing the negative roles of state run capitalism and growth-fixated monetary policy, estimates Chinese economic growth to slide to only 4 percent by 2020.

 

Militarily, the United States has hundreds of bases around the world, 11 aircraft carrier battle fleets, tens of thousands of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, well trained officers and numerous major allies around the world. China, whose military spending is less than 30 percent of American spending, is still working on its first aircraft carrier (bought from Ukraine), imports major weapon systems from Russia, and has a small strategic nuclear force. A large number of its officers are of peasant origins. It lacks any major allies.

 

The United States created a government of laws, an independent judiciary and the protection of civil liberties. In China, the government does not allow free speech, assembly, an independent judiciary or religion. Massive corruption has allowed high Chinese Communist government or party officials to reap fortunes of hundreds of millions, even billions, of dollars.

 

 

The United States has been a world leader in quality of life, with more than 60 percent of the population owning their own homes and over 90 percent owning cars. By contrast, with 50 percent of the population still living in dire conditions in the countryside and massive air, water and soil pollution killing 1.2 million people a year, Chinese quality of life is quite poor. A recent poll showed that more than 60 percent of the wealthiest Chinese want to leave the country.

 

Finally, in a world increasingly dominated by advances in high technology, China lags far behind the United States. While the United States has the majority of leading high-tech companies – Google, Apple, Cisco, Hewlett-Packard, Microsoft, Oracle and others – China has almost none. Neo-Confucianism and Communism have suppressed Chinese creativity. Since 1950, not a single Chinese scientist working in China has won a Nobel Prize in Science. By contrast, the United States since 1945 has won a staggering 235 Nobel Prizes in science.

 

Overall, then China has come a long way but still has a long way to go to become a global superpower.

[Bugatti Veyron]

http://finance.yahoo.com/news/why-china-wont-asias-dominant-power-051729819.html

[oscartamaguchiblackface]

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/14491/vietnam-s-modernizing-navy-confronts-china-s-sea-power

 

 

Vietnam’s Modernizing Navy Confronts China’s Sea Power

http://static.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/14491/l_vietnam_navy_11192014.png Vietnam People’s Navy honor guard at the ASEAN defense ministers meeting, Hanoi, Vietnam, Oct. 12, 2010 (U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison).

 

 

As China attempts to assert maritime claims against neighboring Vietnam, Vietnam in turn has been expanding its navy and courting new allies, such as India. In an email interview, Abhijit Singh, a research fellow at India’s Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, discusses the capabilities of the Vietnamese navy, known as the Vietnam People's Navy.

 

WPR: What is Vietnam’s naval capacity, and how operationally prepared is its navy?

 

Abhijit Singh: Vietnam’s navy has modernized from a small coastal patrol force with limited capacity in the 1980s into a seagoing, fairly competent, combat-worthy navy. Equipped with old Soviet-era hardware and an assortment of small seagoing vessels until a decade ago, it has now upgraded itself into a modern, though still compact, fighting force. The force today consists of frigates, corvettes, patrol craft, missile boats, maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) and even submarines. Unable to effectively defend its maritime stakes for much of the 1990s and 2000s, the recent improvements in the Vietnamese navy’s operational capability have expanded its ability protect its waters.

 

WPR: What are Vietnam’s maritime interests, and how effective is its navy at protecting them?

 

Singh: Vietnam’s maritime interests lie in defending its sovereign stakes in the South China Sea. This includes patrolling its legitimate Exclusive Economic Zone and maintaining its claims over the Spratly and Paracel islands, even though the latter are controlled by China. Vietnam’s principle challenge has been to counter Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea. And although it continues to remain inferior to the People’s Liberation Army Navy, the Vietnamese navy has improved its effectiveness in protecting its maritime interests.

 

WPR: What steps is Vietnam taking to increase its naval capacity, and who are its main naval partners in terms of supplies and training?

 

Singh: Vietnam’s essential strategy has been to build up its navy through strategic partnerships and high-profile procurement deals. Vietnam’s principal strategic partners are Russia and India. Moscow supplied Hanoi with two Gepard class ASW frigates in 2011, and more recently delivered three submarines as part of a $1.8 billion deal for six diesel-powered 636 Kilo-class boats. Two of these have even begun operational deployments in Vietnamese waters. Russia also recently signed a contract for the supply of 12 Su-30 Mk-2 multirole fighter aircraft to provide air cover to its naval fleet. Meanwhile India, Vietnam’s other strategic collaborator, has offered assistance in procuring patrol boats using a $100 million credit line. Besides procuring naval platforms from India and Russia, Vietnam has been dealing with the Netherlands for the future supply of four high-end Sigma-class corvettes, and has also acquired three twin Otter MPAs from Canada.

 

India, which in the past had supplied spare parts for Russian-made Petya-class warships and OSA-II class missile boats to the Vietnamese navy, is today Hanoi’s main training partner. The Indian navy has begun training a large number of Vietnamese sailors in submarine operations and underwater warfare at its INS Satavahana submarine school in Visakhapatnam. With its experience since the mid-1980s of operating Russian Kilo-class submarines, Indian assistance is seen as an invaluable asset, not only for the submarine training program, but also for the training of Sukhoi pilots and for assisting Vietnamese military personnel in improving their information technology and English-language skills.

 

[maddromeo]

They're selling us again the idea of reviving the Southeast-Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) or a larger Pan-Asian equivalent.

 

http://asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/Geopolitico/Anders-Corr-China-threat-requires-an-Asian-NATO

 

Anders Corr: China threat requires an Asian NATO

 

"...The increasing belligerence of China in the East and South China seas, and towards India, has fundamentally destabilized the security dynamics of Asia. Japan is seeking a closer alliance with India, and is likely seeking advanced offensive weapons from the U.S. Vietnam is considering a U.S. alliance. China increasingly makes common cause with Russia, using unethical and illegal practices in trade and geopolitics.

 

While existing bilateral alliances go partway towards defending against the resurgent autocratic threat, only a formalized multilateral treaty organization would provide the coordination necessary to defend democracy and international law in Asia against emerging threats. To survive, Asian democracies must create what might be called an Asian Treaty Organization, patterned after the successful North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Europe and North America..."

 

 

I have a different idea.

 

"The only way to eliminate an enemy is to make him your friend."

 

Mukhang ok yan Sir! ASEAN NATO! Or just sign along with the BRICS or SCO! We must realize that we are an Asian/ East nation and not American/ West! We must fend off US/Western Imperialism as it is really the major threat out there! Not Ebola, nor China/ Russia or even ISIS! NAM nations is Latin America and in Asia should be united with the BRICS and show the US/West what it feels like to be isolated! All nations must be equal and this is what the Emerging countries asks for, stop the Western hegemony on economics and especially in politics!

[sonnyt111]

Mukhang ok yan Sir! ASEAN NATO! Or just sign along with the BRICS or SCO! We must realize that we are an Asian/ East nation and not American/ West! We must fend off US/Western Imperialism as it is really the major threat out there! Not Ebola, nor China/ Russia or even ISIS! NAM nations is Latin America and in Asia should be united with the BRICS and show the US/West what it feels like to be isolated! All nations must be equal and this is what the Emerging countries asks for, stop the Western hegemony on economics and especially in politics!

 

Much easier said than done.

[maddromeo]

I agree Sir! If our politicians would only think out our country and citizen instead of their own beneficial gain matagal na sana nangyari ehto! we know how the US/West have bribed and influenced our politics and culture for the past 100 years mukha mahirap talaga ehto! Let us not be fooled with America's false promise of "spreading democracy" in the world! We all know how that happened in our own country not to mention, Iraq, Libya etc... third world countries with insurgents! I can just admire Vietnam for always defending itself! They didn't use military force in fending off the Chinese Oil Rig so why invite back the US (EDCA) back in our country? Political drama lang lahat yan at sinasakyan ng gobyerno natin para ma approve ang pagbalik ng US bases! tsktsk

[camiar]

Mukhang ok yan Sir! ASEAN NATO! Or just sign along with the BRICS or SCO! We must realize that we are an Asian/ East nation and not American/ West! We must fend off US/Western Imperialism as it is really the major threat out there! Not Ebola, nor China/ Russia or even ISIS! NAM nations is Latin America and in Asia should be united with the BRICS and show the US/West what it feels like to be isolated! All nations must be equal and this is what the Emerging countries asks for, stop the Western hegemony on economics and especially in politics!

 

If we go by the NATO model in establishing SEATO, it will be aligned with the US. The idea behind the Asian version of NATO is to contain China, just as NATO was formed to contain Russia.

[maddromeo]

If we go by the NATO model in establishing SEATO, it will be aligned with the US. The idea behind the Asian version of NATO is to contain China, just as NATO was formed to contain Russia.

 

Putcha kung ganyan lang eh wag na! "Kali wali" then better remain a NAM country!!! And have better bilateral ties with our Asian neighbors!

 

I really don't get it! Why the US/Europe so insecure with China/Russia eversince!?

[oscartamaguchiblackface]

This is quite alarming....

 

http://theweek.com/article/index/274016/chinas-leader-is-telling-the-peoples-liberation-army-to-prepare-for-war

 

China's leader is telling the People's Liberation Army to prepare for war

Chinese President Xi Jinping's recent statements have been alarming China's neighbors. What's behind them?

By Kyle Mizokami | 7:01am ET

432

Preparing for what? (REUTERS/Stringer)

Over the last several months, Chinese leader Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party have repeatedly exhorted the People's Liberation Army to "be ready to win a war." Xi has repeatedly called for greater military modernization, increased training, and enhanced overall readiness of the Chinese army, navy, and air force.

These repeated calls have alarmed China's neighbors from New Delhi to Washington. The question on everyone's mind: what is all this preparation for?

Is the Chinese leadership preparing for something? Are they gearing up for a military operation, or merely the option to carry one out? Or is there a more innocent explanation for all of this?

One credible explanation is that the Chinese leadership is pushing military readiness as part of the ongoing, national anti-corruption drive. Military anti-corruption efforts have been highlighted by the arrest and imminent court martial of Xu Caihou, a former high level military officer. Xu faces charges of embezzlement, bribery, misuse of state funds, and abuse of power, and is thought to have made at least $5.9 million by selling officer promotions.

Corruption in the Chinese military is thought to be widespread. Although the true effects are not known, it has resulted in ineligible officers being promoted, diversion of state funds, and sweetheart deals between military contractors and officials. Perhaps most importantly, time spent by corrupt officials making money is time not spent training the troops for conflict.

Although the Communist Party's message to "prepare to win a war" may seem bellicose, the government may simply be telling the military to stop making money on the side and just do their jobs.

Another possibility is that Xi and the Party are pushing for the Chinese military to adopt readiness levels on par with the Pentagon. The U.S. military, which is frequently deployed around the world, often on short notice, trains to a relatively high standard. Much of a typical deployment, such as operating planes from an aircraft carrier flight deck, is dangerous work that can only be safely accomplished by training to high level of proficiency.

It's quite possible that China wants the military to achieve this skill level too, for no other reason than to have it. This on the face of it does not imply aggressive intent, only a desire for a prepared military.

Of course, it's possible that the Chinese government has something more sinister in mind.

The Party may desire the ability to conduct military action overseas as a diversion from domestic issues. In recent years, China has used territorial claims in the East and South China Seas and the Taiwan issue to divert public attention from problems at home, even going so far as to organize protests. Political grievances, environmental pollution, food scandals, government land grabs, lack of affordable healthcare, and, most importantly, government corruption are all issues that have sparked civil unrest.

As the Chinese economy slows down, the Communist Party may be worried that decreased economic activity could lead to more domestic unhappiness. A military expedition that united the country behind the government could be an option they'd consider.

In 1982, the generals that ruled Argentina invaded the nearby Falkland Islands, a United Kingdom territory, in a bid to co-opt anti-government dissent. The junta ruling the country believed that invading the Falklands, regarded by Argentines across the political spectrum as belonging to their country, would rally the country around the government.

Unfortunately for the generals, military adventurism is a two-edged sword. The U.K. sent a naval task force to retake the Falklands and Argentina's ensuing defeat proved the downfall of the regime.

Thanks to its recent territorial spats, China has a wealth of option for adventurism, such as sending naval vessels to the Diaoyu Islands (known as Senkaku Islands to Japan) in the East China Sea, making a demonstration of force near Taiwan, or even picking a fight with smaller countries such as the Philippines. Well-trained armed forces are necessary even in operations short of war; a show of force can quickly become a demonstration of incompetence.

We don't really know what is pushing Xi and company's seemingly bellicose exhortations. Much of the decision-making taking place in the Chinese military is a black box opaque to the outside world. Maybe China is preparing for something. Maybe it isn't. Maybe they're preparing for something and even they don't know what it is.

Or maybe they're just telling their people to do their jobs.

[Bugatti Veyron]

http://www.lawfareblog.com/2015/01/the-united-states-and-chinas-nine-dash-claim/

 

Lawfare Hard National Security Choices

The United States and China’s Nine-Dash Claim

By Sean Mirski
Wednesday, January 7, 2015 at 12:35 PM

Early last month, the U.S. State Department released the latest in its Limits in the Seas series. These surveys examine the maritime claims of nations around the world and analyze whether they are consistent with international law.

Normally, these reports constitute fascinating reading for a small community of maritime law enthusiasts, but they tend to be fairly bloodless otherwise. Not so with the latest, though: No. 143 brings China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea under sustained legal scrutiny and finds them wanting.

This report is valuable on its own terms as the most developed and detailed U.S. government position on China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea. After all, up until recently, the American government has been somewhat reticent to publicly announce its position on China’s maritime claims. But besides adding another round of criticism to the barrage that started last February with Assistant Secretary Russel and U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Greenert, the report may also have significant implications for the ongoing arbitration between the Philippines and China over the latter’s maritime claims in the South China Sea. In particular, the report demonstrates a possible method by which the tribunal can skirt one of the most challenging issues in the litigation—figuring out what, exactly, China’s claims actually are.

Accordingly, Lawfare summarizes the contents of the report below the fold.

I. China’s Nine-Dash Line

The report begins by describing China’s claims to parts of the South China Sea from both a historical and a geographic perspective. In recent years, China’s claims have largely been understood by reference to the infamous “nine-dash” line, which appeared on a map presented by China to the international community in 2009.

According to the 2009 map, the nine-dash line runs along Vietnam’s coast, crosses the South China Sea to the coast of Malaysia, and then snakes its way up along the Malaysian, Bruneian, and Philippine coasts before finishing east of Taiwan. As the report notes, the nine-dash line darts extremely close to the coasts of neighboring states—in fact, the dashes are generally closer to those coasts than they are to any islands within the South China Sea.

 

http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Nine-Dash.png

When it submitted the map, Beijing said simply that “China has indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters, and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof (see attached map).”

II. Basis of Analysis

Next, the report turns to the relevant maritime law as reflected in the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In most cases, the rules are relatively simple once a state knows the land feature from which it is measuring a maritime zone. Coastal states are entitled to a territorial sea stretching 12 nautical miles from their coastal baselines. They also get more limited sovereign rights for certain purposes within their exclusive economic zones (EEZs)—which extend up to 200 nautical miles from the coastal baselines—and over their continental shelf, which is the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond the territorial sea to the outer edge of the continental margin or up to 200 nautical miles.

But the rules get a little more complicated with respect to islands. Technically speaking, an island is “a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.” Accordingly, if a maritime feature is not above water at high-tide—in other words, if it is a “low-tide elevation” or a submerged feature—then it is generally not entitled to any maritime zone. Instead, these features are considered part of the seabed and subsoil, so they are “subject to the regime of the maritime zone in which they are found.”

But if the maritime feature does poke its head above water at high tide, then it counts as an island. For the most part, islands get the same maritime zones as other types of land territory. However, there is an exception: if an island “cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of [its] own,” then it is characterized as a “rock.” Rocks do not generate entitlements to either EEZs or continental shelves; in other words, they are limited to a 12 nautical mile territorial sea.

In short, it matters tremendously for the purpose of drawing maritime zones whether a feature is a habitable island, a rock, or a low-tide elevation/submerged feature. (Parenthetically, these distinctions are at the heart of Manila’s pending arbitration case against China—the Philippines claims that regardless of who has sovereignty over the maritime features, many of these features are not habitable islands, and thus they do not generate entitlements to the wide-ranging sort of maritime zones that China seems to assume they do.)

Finally, this section of the report touches on the international law relating to “historic” bays and titles. The United States takes the position that in order to establish the existence of this type of maritime entitlement, a claimant must demonstrate “(1) open, notorious, and effective exercise of authority over the body of water in question; (2) continuous exercise of that authority; and (3) acquiescence by foreign States in the exercise of that authority.” Perhaps most importantly, historic bays and titles are “strictly limited geographically and substantively” – they “apply only with respect to bays and similar near-shore coastal configurations, not in areas of EEZ, continental shelf, or high seas.”

III. Analysis

The report opens its analysis by distinguishing between China’s claims to territory in the South China Sea—in other words, claims of sovereignty over habitable islands and rocks—and its claims to the Sea’s waters. The report disclaims any interest in analyzing China’s territorial claims, and instead, it focuses solely on China’s maritime claims.

At this point, the U.S. government runs into a problem. Beijing has never clarified the nature of its maritime claims within the nine-dash line; indeed, it has sent a variety of contradictory messages, and its 2009 statement on the matter is maddeningly unhelpful and seemingly designed to obscure rather than clarify. To evade this legal fog, though, the study cleverly analyzes three possible interpretations of China’s nine-dash line claim, and whether any of those interpretations are consistent with the international law of the sea. We’ll address each interpretation in turn.

First, the nine-dash line may simply “indicate[] only the islands over which China claims sovereignty.” If so, then the line does not raise any interesting questions under maritime law. Instead, China would presumably be limited in its maritime claims to any zones to which it is entitled under UNCLOS rather than all the waters enclosed within the nine-dash line.

Second, the nine-dash line could alternatively be interpreted as indicating a “national boundary between China and neighboring States.” If so, then the line is inconsistent with international law. China cannot unilaterally decide where its borders end because neighboring states must delimit boundaries “by agreement.” In addition, the line “lack other important hallmarks of a maritime boundary, such as a published list of geographic coordinates and a continuous, unbroken line that separates the maritime space of two countries.” And even if the line is taken as a unilateral position on what the boundary should be, Beijing has failed to explain why the boundary should be drawn so close to other States’ coasts and so far from even the South China Sea islands claimed by China. Plus, Beijing has not explained “the related question of what kind of rights or jurisdiction China is asserting for itself within the line,” which becomes a serious issue because in several cases, the line’s dashes are located beyond even the 200 nautical mile limit of EEZs from Chinese-claimed land features.

Third and finally, the nine-dash line could be read as marking out the limits of a “historic” claim. As the report notes, a “historic claim might be one of sovereignty over the maritime space (‘historic waters’ or ‘historic title’) or, alternatively, some lesser set of rights (‘historic rights’) to the maritime space.”

As a threshold matter, the report argues that China has not even made a “cognizable claim to either ‘historic waters’ or ‘historic rights’ to the waters of the South China Sea within the dashed line.” International law requires “international notoriety” in asserting a historic claim to put other countries on notice of the possible existence of such a claim. Problematically for Beijing, “there appears to be no Chinese law, declaration, proclamation, or other official statement describing and putting the international community on notice of a historic claim to the waters within the dashed line.” Worse, China’s claims “lack the precision, clarity, and consistency that could convey the nature and scope of a maritime claim.” Indeed, Beijing has never released the geographic coordinates of any of the nine dashes, and the location (and size) of the dashes seems to vary from map to map. These inconsistencies can be substantial: for example, one dash appears 45 nautical miles closer to Vietnam’s coast on the 2009 map than it does on a 1947 map.

But even if Beijing had made a cognizable claim, it would violate international law. In the first instance, “the LOS Convention limits the relevance of historic claims to bays and territorial sea delimitation.” In contrast, the nine-dash line encompasses open waters far from any nearby islands. The claim also fails every element of the three-part legal test for historic waters described earlier: the claim was not made openly or notoriously (indeed, it is still unclear!); China has not exercised effective and continuous authority in those waters (for instance, other states have used the waters of the South China Sea); and no state has recognized or acquiesced to any exercise of Chinese authority in those waters (and “[a]ny alleged tacit acquiescence by States can be refuted by the lack of meaningful notoriety of any historic claim by China”).

In sum, the report concludes that “unless China clarifies that the dashed-line claim reflects only a claim to islands within that line and any maritime zones that are generated from those land features in accordance with the international law of the sea, as reflected in the LOS Convention, its dashed-line claim does not accord with the international law of the sea.”

[sonnyt111]

^{http://news.yahoo.com/u-rebalance-asia-begins-major-military-drill-philippines-054740363.html}

 

^{U.S. rebalance to Asia begins with major military drill in Philippines}

^{http://l.yimg.com/a/p/us/news/editorial/d/0c/d0c3eb8ca18907492a4b337b5cec5193.jpeg}

^{By Manuel Mogato 1 hour ago}

 

 

By Manuel Mogato

MANILA (Reuters) - Philippine and U.S. soldiers began their biggest combined military exercise in 15 years on Monday, in a demonstration of Washington's commitment to its long-time ally as it rebalances to Asia in the face of China's expansion in the South China Sea. The annual "Balikatan" (shoulder-to-shoulder) war games are part of a new U.S. military initiative known as Pacific Pathways, involving a series of drills across the Asia-Pacific as America deploys more troops, ships and aircraft in the region. "The exercises this week are part of a U.S. rebalance to Asia starting with Balikatan in the Philippines," Major-General Raul del Rosario told Reuters as more than 1,000 US Army troops joined the drills at a jungle army base. Pacific Pathways, which Washington says is part of a plan to establish a "semi-permanent" U.S. presence in Asia, will comprise 29 exercises across 12 countries in the region over the next five years. The exercise comes a few days after the Philippines said it was seeking more "substantive" support from the United States on how to counter China's rapid expansion in the South China Sea. China's rapid reclamation around seven reefs in the Spratly archipelago of the South China Sea has alarmed claimants, including the Philippines and Vietnam, and drawn growing criticism from U.S. government officials and the military. U.S. President Barack Obama has said Washington is concerned China is using its "sheer size and muscle" to push around smaller nations in the disputed sea, drawing a swift rebuke from Beijing. "We make no pretense that we are helping the Philippines as it fields a minimum credible defense," U.S. Ambassador Philip Goldberg said at the drills' opening ceremony. "The U.S. is committed to its alliance ... and the U.S. will defend the important principles of freedom of navigation in the air and the sea." In Beijing, foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei said China hoped the U.S. and Philippines "do more that is beneficial to increasing mutual security trust between countries in the region and that is beneficial to regional peace and stability". More than 11,000 American and Filipino troops are taking part in the 10-day drill on the islands of Luzon, Palawan and Panay. The war games will see U.S. fighters rehearse bombing runs and troops involved in live fire drills. Dozens of leftwing activists protested outside the U.S. embassy in Manila, saying the Americans were using China as a bogeyman to gain a forward base in the Philippines.

[maxiev]

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/taiwan-asias-next-mighty-military-power-12838

[sandy51]

Vietnam

Vietnam was considered primitive but it defeated the French, the Americans and (the Chinese say no) but the fact is that the Chinese withdrew from Vietnam and this was at a time when Vietnam also had another front - Cambodia.

This just comes to my mind because the AFP keeps talking modernization