South China/West Philippine Sea

[maxiev]

Here's an interesting analysis regarding how politics and vested interests within the PROC play a role in the South China/West Philippine Sea dispute. A bit of a long read but worth the time in my opinion.

 

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china%E2%80%99s-epic-fail-the-south-china-sea-11019

 

China’s Epic Fail in the South China Sea

Bill Hayton

 

August 5, 2014

 

By whatever metric you choose, China’s recent oil-drilling adventure in the South China Sea was a disaster. No new oil will reach Chinese consumers, no new maritime territory has been gained and regional advantage has been handed to the United States. ASEAN solidarity has held firm and the positions of ‘pro-Beijing’ forces in crucial countries, particularly Vietnam, have been seriously weakened. China’s foreign-policy making has proven to be incompetent. How did it all go so wrong?

 

We can’t know what the Chinese leadership hoped to achieve when it approved the deployment of the country’s largest oil rig and a small armada of protecting vessels into waters also claimed by Vietnam. It seems unlikely that the operation was simply an attempt to find oil. There are many better places to go prospecting. On March 19, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) announced it had discovered a mid-sized gas field in uncontested waters closer to Hainan Island. Exploitation of that field was delayed while the Paracels adventure unfolded farther south.

 

The two areas of seabed explored by the giant drilling rig HS-981 are not good prospects for hydrocarbons. A 2013 report by the U.S. Energy Information Administration suggested the Paracels’ energy potential is low. It seems significant that CNOOC, China’s most-experienced offshore operator, was not involved in the expedition. Although CNOOC’s subsidiary COSL was operating the rig, the overall operation was directed by the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) which has much less experience of exploration in the South China Sea.

 

HS981 ended its mission a month early, in the face of the impending arrival of super-typhoon Rammasun. CNPC declared that the rig had found hydrocarbons, but was very unspecific about details and amounts. It is almost certain that they will never be commercially exploited for both technical and political reasons. This operation was not really about oil.

 

One motivation can be safely ruled out. We know that the mission was not an attempt to rouse popular nationalist feeling in China because, as the Australian researcher Andrew Chubb has shown, news about the clashes between the rig’s protection fleet and the Vietnamese coast guard was kept out of the Chinese media for a week afterwards.

 

There may well have been another political purpose, however. An operation of such magnitude must have been planned well in advance and approved at the highest level. Chinese authorities announced that the rig had arrived on station on May 3, exactly one week before the summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was due to get underway in Myanmar. Perhaps Beijing was hoping to repeat its success at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Phnom Penh in July 2012. On that occasion, ASEAN split: Cambodia vetoed a collective statement, leaving the Philippines and Vietnam isolated in their sea disputes with China.

 

If China was hoping to achieve the same thing over the Paracels, the effect was exactly the opposite. ASEAN came together in a conspicuous display of unity and issued a joint statement, in effect telling Beijing to back off. This was the first time the organization had taken a position on the Paracels—which is a purely bilateral dispute between China and Vietnam (unlike the Spratly Island disputes which affect five ASEAN members, including Indonesia). Andrew Chubb has argued that this quiet display of solidarity had much more of an impact in Beijing than the high-volume statements from Washington.

 

Some commentators have suggested that the episode was an example of “salami slicing”—a steady process of occupying areas of the South China Sea in small steps without attracting too much attention. But if that was the aim, it also failed since, with the withdrawal of the oil rig, the waters are, once again, unoccupied. The “slice” has rejoined the salami. The politburo may have thought that a decisive statement of maritime control would strengthen China’s territorial claim to the islands, but Vietnam’s robust response is equally good proof that it disputes that claim.

 

The Australian analyst Hugh White has argued that China’s purpose in provoking such confrontations is to deliberately stretch and weaken the security linkages that bind the United States to Southeast Asia. “By confronting America's friends with force”, he says, “China confronts America with the choice between deserting its friends and fighting China. Beijing is betting that, faced with this choice, America will back off and leave its allies and friends unsupported. This will weaken America's alliances and partnerships, undermine U.S. power in Asia, and enhance China's power.”

 

But Vietnam is not an ally of the United States, so this episode was a better demonstration of the problems of standing against China alone. However, in provoking this confrontation, Beijing has achieved the opposite of White’s expectations: pushing Hanoi closer to Washington. As David Elliott's recent book makes clear (and see my review here), Vietnam’s foreign-policy orientation has been generally pro-China ever since it stopped being pro-USSR. Over the past two decades, it was only when the “pro-China” voices were weakened by policy failures and Chinese antagonism—that liberalizers were able to reorientate Vietnam’s foreign policy.

 

The analyst Zachary Abuza has given us an enlightening account of how the balance of forces within the upper leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam has changed as a result of the oil-rig standoff. “A June 2014 meeting of the Vietnam Communist Party's Central Committee unanimously resolved to condemn Chinese aggression and encroachment” he tells us. In late July, Politburo member Pham Quang Nghi made an intriguing visit to the United States at the invitation of the State Department.

 

In short, whatever China hoped to achieve with the deployment of HS-981—oil, territorial advantage or long-term strategic gain—didn’t work out. How can we explain such a foreign-policy failure? I think the episode shows how China’s South China Sea policy is more a reflection of internal priorities than a considered foreign policy. In short, the South China Sea has become a giant pork barrel for some of China’s provinces, state agencies and state-owned enterprises.

 

Two decades ago, John Garver argued that the Chinese navy’s push into the South China Sea represented “the interaction of national and bureaucratic interests”. They’re still interacting. Their navy’s getting bigger along with its budgets. Prestige, promotion and pecuniary rewards are following. The same is true of the new China Coast Guard—a year after the merging of several smaller maritime authorities into one. The Coast Guard needs to focus on something other than internal squabbling as it completes that merger and both it and the navy are looking for missions to demonstrate their usefulness and justify their funding.

 

And what’s true of the military is true of southern provinces. Hainan is China’s smallest province and relatively poor with an economy dominated by agriculture. In recent years it’s put great efforts into developing its fishing industries and become expert at harvesting state subsidies to equip new boats. Some excellent on-the-ground reporting by Reuters last month reminded us of the hundreds, perhaps thousands of fishing boats receiving between $300 and $500 per day to go fishing in disputed waters. While one captain noted that, “The authorities support fishing in the South China Sea to protect China's sovereignty” it might be just as accurate to say the authorities make use of the sovereignty claim in order to justify the support for fishing. Reuters discovered that eight trawlers being launched in the port of Dongfang on Hainan would each qualify for $322,500 in “renovation” grants.

 

Oil companies are also able to play the sovereignty card in support of their semi-commercial ventures in the South China Sea. In May 2012, when CNOOC launched the heavily-subsidised deep water rig at the centre of the Paracels standoff, HS-981, its chairman famously described it as, “mobile national territory and a strategic weapon”.

 

It seems strange, therefore, that CNOOC was not in charge of the Paracels expedition. Why was this? We're not privy to the corporate machinations but a few explanations suggest themselves. CNPC may have been willing to take risks that CNOOC wasn't—both technical and political. This was the first time that HS-981 had been used in deep water and the first time in disputed water. Perhaps CNPC was trying to steal a march on CNOOC by staking a claim in an unexplored area. Or perhaps CNPC’s senior management was trying to get itself out of deep political trouble. Spiralling corruption allegations against the company were becoming a national political scandal. CNPC’s management might have regarded a mission to fly the flag in disputed territory as a way of currying favour with the Politburo and saving their skins.

 

None of this is meant to deny that the Chinese participants in the oilrig standoff believe wholeheartedly in the validity of their country’s territorial claim in the South China Sea. The legend of China’s ‘indisputable sovereignty’ has been inculcated into generations of Chinese children. I have argued elsewhere that this belief depends upon early-twentieth century misreadings of Southeast Asian history by Chinese nationalists but I have no doubt that the Chinese leadership sincerely believes in its correctness.

 

Nonetheless, for special interests inside the Chinese party-state bureaucracy, the South China Sea has become a giant political piñata. They simply have to whack the issue from time to time to provoke another stream of subsidies from on high. Chinese policy in the Sea is less likely to be the result of a considered summation of reasoned arguments than the unpredictable result of an agglomeration of lobbying campaigns. When they work together, the power of these interest groups is immense: they can sway Communist Party policy to their advantage. One thing they can all agree on, whether for reasons of nationalism, security, profit or jobs, is that China must have access to the resources of the South China Sea.

 

Too many commentators have been taken in by China's propaganda efforts. The myth of Beijing's inscrutable invincibility is taking root in the op-ed pages of too many news outlets. The result is that even when China blunders, it’s assumed to be simply a cover for a more sophisticated and nefarious plot. It’s time to dispel the myth and see Beijing's blunders for what they really are. At the moment, cockup is a better guide to China’s moves in the South China Sea than conspiracy.

 

Bill Hayton is the author of The South China Sea: the struggle for power in Asia to be published by Yale University Press shortly.

[Bugatti Veyron]

Here's an interesting analysis regarding how politics and vested interests within the PROC play a role in the South China/West Philippine Sea dispute. A bit of a long read but worth the time in my opinion.

 

http://nationalinter...china-sea-11019

 

China's Epic Fail in the South China Sea

Bill Hayton

 

August 5, 2014

 

By whatever metric you choose, China's recent oil-drilling adventure in the South China Sea was a disaster. No new oil will reach Chinese consumers, no new maritime territory has been gained and regional advantage has been handed to the United States. ASEAN solidarity has held firm and the positions of 'pro-Beijing' forces in crucial countries, particularly Vietnam, have been seriously weakened. China's foreign-policy making has proven to be incompetent. How did it all go so wrong?

 

We can't know what the Chinese leadership hoped to achieve when it approved the deployment of the country's largest oil rig and a small armada of protecting vessels into waters also claimed by Vietnam. It seems unlikely that the operation was simply an attempt to find oil. There are many better places to go prospecting. On March 19, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) announced it had discovered a mid-sized gas field in uncontested waters closer to Hainan Island. Exploitation of that field was delayed while the Paracels adventure unfolded farther south.

 

The two areas of seabed explored by the giant drilling rig HS-981 are not good prospects for hydrocarbons. A 2013 report by the U.S. Energy Information Administration suggested the Paracels' energy potential is low. It seems significant that CNOOC, China's most-experienced offshore operator, was not involved in the expedition. Although CNOOC's subsidiary COSL was operating the rig, the overall operation was directed by the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) which has much less experience of exploration in the South China Sea.

 

HS981 ended its mission a month early, in the face of the impending arrival of super-typhoon Rammasun. CNPC declared that the rig had found hydrocarbons, but was very unspecific about details and amounts. It is almost certain that they will never be commercially exploited for both technical and political reasons. This operation was not really about oil.

 

One motivation can be safely ruled out. We know that the mission was not an attempt to rouse popular nationalist feeling in China because, as the Australian researcher Andrew Chubb has shown, news about the clashes between the rig's protection fleet and the Vietnamese coast guard was kept out of the Chinese media for a week afterwards.

 

There may well have been another political purpose, however. An operation of such magnitude must have been planned well in advance and approved at the highest level. Chinese authorities announced that the rig had arrived on station on May 3, exactly one week before the summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was due to get underway in Myanmar. Perhaps Beijing was hoping to repeat its success at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' meeting in Phnom Penh in July 2012. On that occasion, ASEAN split: Cambodia vetoed a collective statement, leaving the Philippines and Vietnam isolated in their sea disputes with China.

 

If China was hoping to achieve the same thing over the Paracels, the effect was exactly the opposite. ASEAN came together in a conspicuous display of unity and issued a joint statement, in effect telling Beijing to back off. This was the first time the organization had taken a position on the Paracels—which is a purely bilateral dispute between China and Vietnam (unlike the Spratly Island disputes which affect five ASEAN members, including Indonesia). Andrew Chubb has argued that this quiet display of solidarity had much more of an impact in Beijing than the high-volume statements from Washington.

 

Some commentators have suggested that the episode was an example of "salami slicing"—a steady process of occupying areas of the South China Sea in small steps without attracting too much attention. But if that was the aim, it also failed since, with the withdrawal of the oil rig, the waters are, once again, unoccupied. The "slice" has rejoined the salami. The politburo may have thought that a decisive statement of maritime control would strengthen China's territorial claim to the islands, but Vietnam's robust response is equally good proof that it disputes that claim.

 

The Australian analyst Hugh White has argued that China's purpose in provoking such confrontations is to deliberately stretch and weaken the security linkages that bind the United States to Southeast Asia. "By confronting America's friends with force", he says, "China confronts America with the choice between deserting its friends and fighting China. Beijing is betting that, faced with this choice, America will back off and leave its allies and friends unsupported. This will weaken America's alliances and partnerships, undermine U.S. power in Asia, and enhance China's power."

 

But Vietnam is not an ally of the United States, so this episode was a better demonstration of the problems of standing against China alone. However, in provoking this confrontation, Beijing has achieved the opposite of White's expectations: pushing Hanoi closer to Washington. As David Elliott's recent book makes clear (and see my review here), Vietnam's foreign-policy orientation has been generally pro-China ever since it stopped being pro-USSR. Over the past two decades, it was only when the "pro-China" voices were weakened by policy failures and Chinese antagonism—that liberalizers were able to reorientate Vietnam's foreign policy.

 

The analyst Zachary Abuza has given us an enlightening account of how the balance of forces within the upper leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam has changed as a result of the oil-rig standoff. "A June 2014 meeting of the Vietnam Communist Party's Central Committee unanimously resolved to condemn Chinese aggression and encroachment" he tells us. In late July, Politburo member Pham Quang Nghi made an intriguing visit to the United States at the invitation of the State Department.

 

In short, whatever China hoped to achieve with the deployment of HS-981—oil, territorial advantage or long-term strategic gain—didn't work out. How can we explain such a foreign-policy failure? I think the episode shows how China's South China Sea policy is more a reflection of internal priorities than a considered foreign policy. In short, the South China Sea has become a giant pork barrel for some of China's provinces, state agencies and state-owned enterprises.

 

Two decades ago, John Garver argued that the Chinese navy's push into the South China Sea represented "the interaction of national and bureaucratic interests". They're still interacting. Their navy's getting bigger along with its budgets. Prestige, promotion and pecuniary rewards are following. The same is true of the new China Coast Guard—a year after the merging of several smaller maritime authorities into one. The Coast Guard needs to focus on something other than internal squabbling as it completes that merger and both it and the navy are looking for missions to demonstrate their usefulness and justify their funding.

 

And what's true of the military is true of southern provinces. Hainan is China's smallest province and relatively poor with an economy dominated by agriculture. In recent years it's put great efforts into developing its fishing industries and become expert at harvesting state subsidies to equip new boats. Some excellent on-the-ground reporting by Reuters last month reminded us of the hundreds, perhaps thousands of fishing boats receiving between $300 and $500 per day to go fishing in disputed waters. While one captain noted that, "The authorities support fishing in the South China Sea to protect China's sovereignty" it might be just as accurate to say the authorities make use of the sovereignty claim in order to justify the support for fishing. Reuters discovered that eight trawlers being launched in the port of Dongfang on Hainan would each qualify for $322,500 in "renovation" grants.

 

Oil companies are also able to play the sovereignty card in support of their semi-commercial ventures in the South China Sea. In May 2012, when CNOOC launched the heavily-subsidised deep water rig at the centre of the Paracels standoff, HS-981, its chairman famously described it as, "mobile national territory and a strategic weapon".

 

It seems strange, therefore, that CNOOC was not in charge of the Paracels expedition. Why was this? We're not privy to the corporate machinations but a few explanations suggest themselves. CNPC may have been willing to take risks that CNOOC wasn't—both technical and political. This was the first time that HS-981 had been used in deep water and the first time in disputed water. Perhaps CNPC was trying to steal a march on CNOOC by staking a claim in an unexplored area. Or perhaps CNPC's senior management was trying to get itself out of deep political trouble. Spiralling corruption allegations against the company were becoming a national political scandal. CNPC's management might have regarded a mission to fly the flag in disputed territory as a way of currying favour with the Politburo and saving their skins.

 

None of this is meant to deny that the Chinese participants in the oilrig standoff believe wholeheartedly in the validity of their country's territorial claim in the South China Sea. The legend of China's 'indisputable sovereignty' has been inculcated into generations of Chinese children. I have argued elsewhere that this belief depends upon early-twentieth century misreadings of Southeast Asian history by Chinese nationalists but I have no doubt that the Chinese leadership sincerely believes in its correctness.

 

Nonetheless, for special interests inside the Chinese party-state bureaucracy, the South China Sea has become a giant political piñata. They simply have to whack the issue from time to time to provoke another stream of subsidies from on high. Chinese policy in the Sea is less likely to be the result of a considered summation of reasoned arguments than the unpredictable result of an agglomeration of lobbying campaigns. When they work together, the power of these interest groups is immense: they can sway Communist Party policy to their advantage. One thing they can all agree on, whether for reasons of nationalism, security, profit or jobs, is that China must have access to the resources of the South China Sea.

 

Too many commentators have been taken in by China's propaganda efforts. The myth of Beijing's inscrutable invincibility is taking root in the op-ed pages of too many news outlets. The result is that even when China blunders, it's assumed to be simply a cover for a more sophisticated and nefarious plot. It's time to dispel the myth and see Beijing's blunders for what they really are. At the moment, cockup is a better guide to China's moves in the South China Sea than conspiracy.

 

Bill Hayton is the author of The South China Sea: the struggle for power in Asia to be published by Yale University Press shortly.

One giant pork barrel pala ito....

[kisshmet]

I doubt if GMA denied the request because there was an ongoing search for a suitable offshore patrol vessel was at that time, and the government was evaluating other alternatives. It was during GMA's term when they came up with the idea of using Malampaya Funds to acquire OPVs to protect our offshore platform and the other oil exploration sites within our EEZ. What was your basis that GMA denied it?

 

The S211 is the lemon of all lemons as far as Trainer/Attack planes are concerned. Though brand new, its optical targeting system sucked from day one. The air force technicians had to use the famous Filipino "diskarte" to use the targeting system recycled from retired F-5's to make some use out of the S-211s other than train pilots how to take off and land a jet. Of the 25 we bought, only 5 are now left flying in so short period of time. S-211s is the Philippine Air Force's version of the "Widow Maker". Anyway, I doubt if Cory has any idea what her government bought for the Air Force at that time. I'd hazard a guess that a few Air Force generals retired rich when the S211s were procured.

 

Glory simply doesn't want to rile the chinks who are the principal sponsors of her pet projects like the NBN-ZTE or north rail among other things

 

S211 is the only remaining air asset with jet propulsion that the PAF still maintain pending acquisition of newer jets. In other words it was supposed to be augmented with the sale of a portion of fort bonifacio and Villamor airbase (AFP modernization program). Unfortunately for the PAF it didn't materialize.

 

This development forced the hands of the PAF to over extend the utilization of these two decades old trainers. After three administrations from the end of corys term, the S211 will get some relief with the new trainers acquired by another Aquino administration

 

Come to think of it, bonifacio global and resorts world are currently flourishing commercial developments. A far cry from its former image of a delapidated military establishments. Ironically, the AFP is still ill-equipped and neglected by the very leaders you support

[sonnyt111]

China's power tripping is now leading them to other areas aside from the South China/West Philippine Sea. I welcome this since it will spread their military forces even thinner. And it means we will have more potential allies such as India.

 

http://www.businessinsider.com/chinese-troops-have-entered-disputed-india-territory-2014-8

 

 

Chinese Troops Have Entered Disputed India Territory Multiple Times In Recent Days

http://static3.businessinsider.com/image/52b30fa969beddbc74f15456-50/afp.jpg AFP

 

Aug. 19, 2014, 8:10 AM

 

Chinese troops have advanced in recent days into disputed territory claimed by India, echoing a similar incursion last year that raised tensions between the two rival giants, official sources said Tuesday.

 

Chinese troops twice crossed over the border into a remote area of the western Himalayas, with some unfurling a banner that read "this is Chinese territory, go back", an official said on condition of anonymity.

 

Indian border police noticed the troops on Sunday in an unpopulated area of Ladakh during a patrol of the informal border that separates India and China.

 

"It was a temporary peaceful face-off with PLA well inside Indian territory," the official told AFP referring to China's People's Liberation Army.

 

He said troops returned to India's Burtse area in Ladakh on Monday displaying a banner "understood to be saying 'this is Chinese territory, go back'."

 

Indian army spokesman Colonel S D Goswami declined to confirm if any such incidents had taken place. But the incursions were confirmed by several official sources.

 

Chinese troops crossed over the border into the same area last April and set up camps, triggering a three-week standoff with Indian soldiers which was only resolved after senior officers from both sides reached an agreement for a joint pullback.

 

That row had threatened to dent improving ties between the two countries which have long been dogged by mutual suspicion -- a legacy of a 1962 border war.

 

The informal border separating China and India is known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC). While it has never been formally demarcated, the countries have signed two accords to maintain peace in frontier areas.

 

Small incursions of a few kilometres (miles) across the contested boundary are common but it is rare for either country to set up camps in disputed territory.

 

 

 

 

 

[Bugatti Veyron]

China is getting bolder as shown in its latest provocative act of harassing a US reconnaissance aircraft.

 

http://www.businessi...hina-sea-2014-8

 

 

That U.S.-China Near-Miss In The South China Sea Is A Sign Of Things To Come

Armin Rosen

Aug. 22, 2014, 5:19 PM

 

This week's reported near-collision between a Chinese fighter plane and an American surveillance aircraft in the East China Sea proves that China isn't afraid to strictly enforce its maritime border in the South China Sea, even if it has to risk a confrontation with the world's most powerful military in the process.

 

As reported by the Washington Free Beacon, a Chinese Navy Shenyang J-11B — a domestically-produced version of the Russian Sukohi-27 — passed dangerously close to a U.S. Navy P-8 Poseidon that was likely in the region to monitor "unprecedented Chinese military exercises held recently and currently underway in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea."

 

The risks of an interception were substantial for China — the fallout of a midair collision between American and Chinese military aircraft inside of China's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) or the seizure of the plane and its crew would be complicated for both sides to deal with, to say the least.

 

The American plane was inside of China's offshore exclusive economic zone, which extends 200 miles from shore, and inside of its air-defense identification zone as well. Foreign ships and aircraft transit inside of other countries' EEZs all the time without triggering an attempted interdiction; the U.S., for instance, treats its EEZ as the high seas, where air traffic rules are more lax than are on land.

 

"China has a pretty restrictive interpretation of international law in its EEZ," Nan Li, an expert in Chinese defense policy at the Naval War college, told Business Insider, noting that China is "very sensitive about surveillance aircraft."

 

Bruce Bennett, a senior defense analyst at RAND, adds this has been a longstanding area of concern for Beijing. "China is very protective of the areas where our reconnaissance aircraft tend to go into," he told Business Insider. "It would be natural them to come in close and let us know that we're not happy that we're there."

 

China energetically polices its offshore boundary, it won't necessarily make an exception for American military aircraft.

 

This map helps explain why.

 

http://static2.businessinsider.com/image/53f7ade169beddf65735ca4b-801-495/screen%20shot%202014-08-22%20at%204.48.13%20pm.png The South China Sea is the site of a slow-motion power struggle, with China claiming territory inside of Vietnam and the Philippines' EEZs. In May, Beijing took the unprecedented measure of moving an oil rig inside of internationally-recognized Vietnamese waters.

 

Disputed oil and gas deposits, regional anxieties about China's rise, and a history of mutual suspicion and hostility between China and its neighbors make the South China Sea one of the more worrying corners of the globe.

 

The U.S.'s "pivot to Asia" — which includes eventual American access to five bases in the Philippines — anticipates the complexities that a newly-ascendant and sometimes aggressive China will create. China's a military and economic giant, but also a self-styled global superpower that's willing to confront both its neighbors and the U.S.

 

Complicating matters is the fact that different countries have different interpretations of what's allowed inside of each other's EEZs, so the boundaries for acceptable action within South China Sea aren't always clear. For instance, there's no current agreement as to whether foreign military activities are permitted in an EEZ under international law — a difference of interpretation that was the source of a 2009 confrontation between the U.S. and China.

 

In March of that year, five Chinese vessels intercepted an unarmed U.S. Naval surveillance vessel called the USNS Impeccable 75 miles south of the island of Heinan. The Impeccable withdrew under armed escort, and after a public protest from the Pentagon, which believed it had a right to operate within China's EEZ.

 

This week's incident offers more proof that China is prepared to take a hard line on its regional territorial rights — which are themselves connected to a series of disputes and conflicting claims that will only become more tense as China's ascension continues.

 

This doesn't mean that China is looking for war with the United States. But it's willing to assert itself in ways that could complicate relations between the two powers, or lead to confrontations that neither anticipates or even wants.

 

The two country's planes missed each other by 30 feet on August 19th. Next time, they might not be so lucky.

Edited August 23, 2014 by Bugatti Veyron

[Bugatti Veyron]

Here Is The Chinese Fighter Jet That Harassed A U.S. Surveillance Plane

By Alberto Riva@albertoriva

on August 22 2014 2:40 PM http://s1.ibtimes.com/sites/www.ibtimes.com/files/styles/v2_article_large/public/2014/08/22/chinese-j-11.jpg?itok=3HLkDytF The Chinese J-11 plane photographed by the crew of a U.S. P-8A Poseidon U.S. Navy The U.S. Navy has released on Friday photographs of the close encounter last week between one of its patrol planes and a Chinese fighter jet, which U.S. officials said came very close and maneuvered dangerously around the American plane.

 

U.S. defense officials told the Washington Free Beacon on Thursday that a Chinese interceptor flew within 50 feet (15 meters) of a Poseidon surveillance aircraft earlier this week The officials said the fighter jet made a barrel roll over the top of the American jet, a move they described as threatening and dangerous.

 

The images show that the Chinese plane was a J-11, a locally produced version of the Sukhoi Su-27, an advanced Russian-made fighter jet.

 

On Friday, Rear Admiral John Kirby, the Pentagon's press secretary, confirmed that the Chinese plane had engaged in dangerous maneuvers, in fact as close as 20 to 30 feet (7 to 10 meters), and said the incident happened on Tuesday 135 miles (200 km) east of Hainan Island.

 

The United States has lodged a formal protest with the Chinese government, the Pentagon spokesman said. The incident took place over international waters, according to the Pentagon.

 

The images published Friday show that the J-11, while turning away from the U.S. plane, showed the crew the air-to-air missiles it carried under the wings -- a procedure not unusual in this type of situation, when the intercepting airplane shows that it has the means of shooting down an intruder. However, intercepts over international waters are typically conducted with the fighter jet maintaining a safe distance from its target. Barrel rolls and aggressive maneuvers are not part of the commonly followed procedure.

 

The American plane was a Boeing P-8A Poseidon, a maritime patrol derivative of the civilian 737 and the latest addition to the U.S. lineup of surveillance aircraft. Equipped with a powerful radar and anti-shipping weapons, the Poseidon is able to find and hit ships and submarines at great distances, as well as conducting electronic surveillance.

 

It has recently been employed in the search for missing Malaysia Airlines flight MH370 in the Indian Ocean.

 

In April 2001, an in-flight collision between a Chinese interceptor and a U.S. spy plane over international waters resulted in the crash of the Chinese jet, killing the pilot, and the emergency landing of the American plane on Hainan Island, where the crew was detained for ten days.

 

http://s1.ibtimes.com/sites/www.ibtimes.com/files/styles/v2_article_large/public/2014/03/17/p-8-poseidon-display-flight.jpg?itok=Ln4t8Yfj A U.S. Navy P-8 Poseidon during its display at the Dubai air show on November 18, 2013 in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Alberto Riva

Edited August 23, 2014 by Bugatti Veyron

[sonnyt111]

Something the US should ponder should it go to war against China.

 

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-homers-iliad-tells-about-us-china-war-11139

 

 

What Homer's Iliad Tells Us about a U.S.-China War

Stephen Fallon August 24, 2014

 

Despite its status as one of the oldest works of literature in the Western canon, Homer’s Iliad boasts enduring relevance. Though it recounts the legend of the Trojan War, it has three key lessons to teach the American strategist who seeks to navigate the Asia-Pacific region.

 

 

 

The Asia-Pacific is experiencing a period of strategic flux in which China is attempting to erode American primacy. War is not likely in the short term, but the risk of conflict will grow if Beijing continues its economic and strategic trajectory. While the region and the world will look to leaders in both countries to mitigate the effects of strategic competition, The Iliad has something to teach us about what may prompt a regional conflict, the risks entailed in seeking to prosecute such a war and how the contest could be resolved.

 

Homer’s compatriot, Thucydides, in his History of the Peloponnesian War, famously suggested that fear initially drove Athens to expand its empire, while honor and interest followed afterwards. The Iliad, however, highlights that honor can be the primary driver of conflict.

 

The Greeks were driven to an amphibious invasion of Troy to satisfy honor. Paris, a Trojan prince, stole Helen from her husband, Menelaus. Agamemnon, leader of the Greeks and Menelaus’ brother, vowed to bring her home. To satisfy this point of honor, he risked the lives of his men, his allies and his own power. By any reasonable standard, this was a disproportionate response. To be sure, Agamemnon would also have been attracted by the prospect of glory and riches, but the loss of Helen and the desire to retrieve her was the casus belli.

 

Such a course of action may be more readily understood when committed to by an ancient society, but honor still drives nations to take disproportionate risks. This is the first lesson the American strategist can draw from The Iliad. Consider, for example, China’s actions in the East China Sea. Beijing is trying to redraw its maritime borders, running the risk of a severe miscalculation that could escalate to a devastating great-power war with Tokyo and Washington. Running such a risk in order to acquire a few paltry rocks, even with the potential natural resources bonanza that possession of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands may bestow, seems irrational if one does not consider the motivating power of honor.

 

One of Beijing’s key motives is to redress its century of humiliation, dating from the First Opium War in 1839 to the founding of the modern People’s Republic in 1949. This era saw China humbled as it was carved up and dictated to by Japan and Western powers. By refusing to acquiesce to Japanese and American desires to return to the pre-existing status quo vis-à-vis the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, Beijing wishes to be seen as a great power that can shape its strategic environment in a way it could not during the slow collapse of the Qing dynasty.

 

This drive to regain national honor cautions us that just as the Greeks went to war because of an upset husband, Beijing may choose to wage war in order to satisfy national honor and avoid what it views as submitting to the same foreign powers responsible for its century of humiliation. When responding to and attempting to shape Chinese behavior, Washington and Tokyo should be cognizant of the influence that preserving national honor may exert on Beijing.

 

While the risk of war between the United States and China is low, The Iliad also has wisdom to impart, should conflict develop in Asia. Homer’s poem recounts a few weeks in the final year of the war. By this stage of the conflict, the Greeks have spent almost a decade at war. In an era before satellite phones and email, characterized by short life expectancy and the ever-present danger of a grisly death, the Greek warriors have spent a significant proportion of their lives fighting in a foreign land.

 

As a result of facing such hardships, their morale is low, and they often voice a desire to return home. In one passage, Homer tells us that Agamemnon, attempting to test his troops, bemoaned the cost of the fighting and the difficulty of conquering Troy. Having offered his men the opportunity to return home, he is shocked when they embrace it:

 

They cried in alarm and charged toward the ships

 

and the dust went whirling up from under rushing feet

 

as the men jostled back and forth, shouting orders—

 

“Grapple the ships! Drag them down to the bright sea!

 

Clean out the launching-channels!” Shrill shouts

 

hitting the heavens, fighters racing for home . . .

 

Agamemnon’s troops would have deserted him had Odysseus not persuaded them to continue the struggle. Nevertheless, this hints at the difficulty of projecting and, even more importantly, sustaining power far from one’s homeland.

 

The Trojans, in contrast, do not enjoy the luxury of retreat. In a particularly moving passage, Hector, a prince of Troy and its finest warrior, returns to his wife and child after a day of fighting. He finds his wife, Andromache, terrified that he will be killed and she will be taken to Greece as a slave, giving us a glimpse of the consequences of defeat:

 

. . . it is less the pain of the Trojans still to come

 

that weighs me down, not even of Hecuba herself

 

or King Priam, or the thought that my own brothers

 

in all their numbers, all their gallant courage,

 

may tumble in the dust, crushed by enemies—

 

That is nothing, beside your agony

 

when some brazen Argive hales you off in tears . . .

 

The lesson for Washington is clear. If asked to fight a great-power war in Asia, the average American, tired of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and eager for nation-building at home, will likely struggle to understand why more American blood and treasure must be sacrificed to support goals so far from home.

 

Should a Sino-American conflict break out, America would at least enjoy the option of returning home across the Pacific. China, however, would not. This would ensure that the result of the conflict would matter more to China. Its vital interests would be more likely to be at stake; it could, therefore, be expected to be willing to make greater sacrifices in order to prevail. When faced with future Sino-American crises, U.S. strategists should bear this in mind. U.S. leaders should not assume that the Chinese will concede, even if faced with the prospect of going to war against Washington.

 

In the event of a Sino-American war, The Iliad has one final lesson to teach. Throughout the fighting described in the poem, the advantage seesaws between the Greeks and Trojans. At one point, led by Hector, the Trojans gain the upper hand and force the Greeks back to their ships. Before the Trojans can annihilate their invader, however, darkness falls.

 

Hector gathers his troops and orders them to rest and feast to restore their strength:

 

Then all night long till the breaking light of day

 

we keep the watch fires blazing, hundreds of fires

 

and the rising glare can leap and hit the skies,

 

so the long-haired Achaeans stand no chance tonight

 

to cut and run on the sea’s broad back. Never,

 

not without a struggle, not at their royal ease

 

are they going to board those ships! No, no,

 

let every last man of them lick his wounds—

 

a memento at home—pierced by arrow or spear

 

as he vaults aboard his decks. So the next fool

 

will cringe at the thought of mounting hateful war

 

against our stallion-breaking Trojans.

 

As Clausewitz would counsel, Hector is seeking the decisive battle, one that will afford him the opportunity to destroy his enemy, deterring future attacks on Troy. This, however, proves to be a fatal error.

 

Had Hector allowed his enemy to withdraw, he would have restored the prewar status quo, ending the war on terms favorable to Troy. True, this decision would have allowed the Greeks to return home, rebuild their strength and perhaps return to attempt to raze Troy in the future, but it would also have afforded Troy an opportunity to rebuild it defenses. Having prevailed once, the Trojans would have been confident of doing so again if the Greeks returned.

 

The lesson here for Washington is that in a conflict with China, America should pursue the limited aim of a return to the pre-existing status quo as quickly as possible. Should China seek to alter the status quo by attempting to conquer Taiwan or take control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, Washington’s goal should be to evict the PLA without escalating the war by, for example, attacking the Chinese mainland.

 

While this may be difficult—any mainland-based assets used to strike U.S. or allied forces will be tempting targets—it would be easier to de-escalate the conflict if Beijing does not feel that it faces an existential threat. Washington should leave open a door for China to exit the conflict with honor, perhaps even with the ability to claim victory, much as it did after its disastrous invasion of Vietnam in 1979. This will increase the odds of the war being concluded on terms favorable to the present regional order.

 

The Iliad tells the story of a war between two great powers, one that is fought over a minor issue and brings great suffering to both. A conflict over territory in the East or South China Seas, the future of Taiwan or the Korean Peninsula holds the potential to do the same today. Though war in the short-to-medium term appears unlikely, American strategists should heed the enduring strategic concepts illuminated in Homer’s epic poem.

 

Stephen Fallon is a freelance writer focusing on strategic issues. He is a graduate of the Australian National University’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre and a researcher at Wikistrat.

 

 

 

 

 

[Soraoi_empire]

Dapat masimulan na yung oil and gas exploration sa Recto Bank baka maunahan pa tayo ng china. Meron na nga pumupuntang chinese vessels dun para magpatrol.

[maxiev]

Here Is The Chinese Fighter Jet That Harassed A U.S. Surveillance Plane

By Alberto Riva@albertoriva

on August 22 2014 2:40 PM http://s1.ibtimes.com/sites/www.ibtimes.com/files/styles/v2_article_large/public/2014/08/22/chinese-j-11.jpg?itok=3HLkDytF The Chinese J-11 plane photographed by the crew of a U.S. P-8A Poseidon U.S. Navy The U.S. Navy has released on Friday photographs of the close encounter last week between one of its patrol planes and a Chinese fighter jet, which U.S. officials said came very close and maneuvered dangerously around the American plane.

 

U.S. defense officials told the Washington Free Beacon on Thursday that a Chinese interceptor flew within 50 feet (15 meters) of a Poseidon surveillance aircraft earlier this week The officials said the fighter jet made a barrel roll over the top of the American jet, a move they described as threatening and dangerous.

 

The images show that the Chinese plane was a J-11, a locally produced version of the Sukhoi Su-27, an advanced Russian-made fighter jet.

 

On Friday, Rear Admiral John Kirby, the Pentagon's press secretary, confirmed that the Chinese plane had engaged in dangerous maneuvers, in fact as close as 20 to 30 feet (7 to 10 meters), and said the incident happened on Tuesday 135 miles (200 km) east of Hainan Island.

 

The United States has lodged a formal protest with the Chinese government, the Pentagon spokesman said. The incident took place over international waters, according to the Pentagon.

 

The images published Friday show that the J-11, while turning away from the U.S. plane, showed the crew the air-to-air missiles it carried under the wings -- a procedure not unusual in this type of situation, when the intercepting airplane shows that it has the means of shooting down an intruder. However, intercepts over international waters are typically conducted with the fighter jet maintaining a safe distance from its target. Barrel rolls and aggressive maneuvers are not part of the commonly followed procedure.

 

The American plane was a Boeing P-8A Poseidon, a maritime patrol derivative of the civilian 737 and the latest addition to the U.S. lineup of surveillance aircraft. Equipped with a powerful radar and anti-shipping weapons, the Poseidon is able to find and hit ships and submarines at great distances, as well as conducting electronic surveillance.

 

It has recently been employed in the search for missing Malaysia Airlines flight MH370 in the Indian Ocean.

 

In April 2001, an in-flight collision between a Chinese interceptor and a U.S. spy plane over international waters resulted in the crash of the Chinese jet, killing the pilot, and the emergency landing of the American plane on Hainan Island, where the crew was detained for ten days.

 

http://s1.ibtimes.com/sites/www.ibtimes.com/files/styles/v2_article_large/public/2014/03/17/p-8-poseidon-display-flight.jpg?itok=Ln4t8Yfj A U.S. Navy P-8 Poseidon during its display at the Dubai air show on November 18, 2013 in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Alberto Riva

The Chinese may have modern and sophisticated aircraft. But Chinese pilots are basically untried and untested unlike American pilots who have decades of experience in aerial combat. In a dogfight between an American fighter and a Chinese one, I'm putting my money on the Americans.

[Bugatti Veyron]

http://news.yahoo.com/philippines-displays-ancient-maps-debunk-chinas-sea-claims-110706447.html

 

 

Philippines displays ancient maps to debunk China's sea claims

http://l.yimg.com/a/p/us/news/editorial/d/0c/d0c3eb8ca18907492a4b337b5cec5193.jpeg By Manuel Mogato 4 hours ago

MANILA (Reuters) - The Philippines on Thursday put on display dozens of ancient maps which officials said showed that China's territorial claims over the South China Sea did not include a disputed shoal at the centre of an acrimonious standoff.

 

The Philippines is in dispute with China over parts of the South China Sea, including the Scarborough Shoal, an area believed to be rich in oil and natural gas as well as fisheries resources.

 

China seized control of the shoal in June 2012 and has prevented Philippine fishermen from getting close to the rocky outcrop, a rich fishing ground.

 

Philippine officials said the exhibition of old maps at a university showed that for almost 1,000 years, from the Song Dynasty in the year 960 until the end of the Qing Dynasty early in the 20th century, China's southernmost territory was always Hainan island, just off the Chinese coast.

 

"We should respect historical facts, not historical lies," said Supreme Court Associate Justice Antonio Carpio, who has done extensive research on the territorial disputes.

 

The facts were graphically illustrated on the ancient maps, both official and unofficial, he said.

 

Carpio said the exhibition could be viewed online and it would help everyone in all claimant states understand the facts, "either to restrain extreme nationalism fuelled by historical lies or give hope to a just and durable settlement of disputes".

 

China claims nearly the entire South China Sea.

 

But Brunei, Malaysia, Vietnam and Taiwan also have claims in the sea, which is traversed each year by ship-borne trade worth about $5 trillion.

 

Exhibition organisers said the Scarborough Shoal never appeared in any old Chinese maps. But on numerous ancient maps made by foreigners and Filipinos, from as early as 1636, the rocky outcrop was consistently shown to be Philippine territory.

 

Carpio, in an earlier lecture, said the shoal was also used as a naval gunnery range by U.S. and Philippine armed forces from the 1960s to the 1980s, and neither China nor any other country protested against the bombing practice.

 

In June, China unveiled a new official map of the country, giving greater play to its claims on the South China Sea.

 

The Philippines, a close U.S. ally, has brought a case to the U.N. arbitral court in The Hague, seeking clarification on its entitlements under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.

 

China has refused to take part in the arbitration. A ruling is expected late next year.

 

 

 

[PTherapist]

Please keep this topic alive.For our country's sake.

[maxiev]

Please keep this topic alive.For our country's sake.

Indeed.

[sonnyt111]

This is what our naval vessels potentially face if China decides to increase the ante.

 

http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/watch-these-russian-missiles-completely-tear-through-a-1636002082

[oscartamaguchiblackface]

http://theweek.com/article/index/264774/why-the-chinese-military-is-only-a-paper-dragon

 

Why the Chinese military is only a paper dragon

 

Corruption, bad neighbors, inflation, and a demographic time bomb — these are just a few of Beijing's woes By Kyle Mizokami, War is Boring | 9:39am ET Why the Chinese military is only a paper dragon Corruption, bad neighbors, inflation, and a demographic time bomb — these are just a few of Beijing's woes By Kyle Mizokami, War is Boring | 9:39am ET 23 98 28 It looks imposing, but… (China Photos/Getty Images) In appearance it is very powerful, but in reality it is nothing to be afraid of — it is a paper tiger. — Mao Zedong on the United States, 1956</p>China's rise over the past 30 years has been nothing short of spectacular.

 

After decades of double-digit growth, today China is the world's second largest economy — and possesses an increasingly sophisticated military that's among the planet's most powerful. Despite China bordering a number of unstable countries, its borders are secure.

 

That wasn't always the case. In 2,000 years, China has suffered invasions, revolutions, and humiliations from the outside world — plus its own internal rebellions. It has been brutalized, conquered, and colonized.

 

No longer. China's defense spending has increased tenfold in 25 years. Beijing is building a powerful blue-water navy, developing stealth fighters, and carefully experimenting with peacekeeping and expeditionary operations.

 

China's military buildup, along with an aggressive foreign policy, has inspired a fair amount of alarm in the West. Some American policymakers consider Beijing to be Washington's only "near-peer competitor" — in other words, the only country with the military might to actually beat the U.S. military in certain circumstances.

 

But they're wrong. Even after decades of expensive rearmament, China is a paper dragon — a version of what Mao Zedong wrongly claimed the United States was … in 1956.

 

China's military budget has grown by double-digits year after year, but inflation has eaten away at the increases. China's army, navy, air force, and missile command are wracked by corruption — and their weapons are, by and large, still greatly inferior to Western equivalents.

 

Yes, the People's Liberation Army is slowly becoming more technologically advanced. But that doesn't mean Beijing can mobilize its armed forces for global missions. Unlike the world's main expeditionary powers — the United States and the U.K., to name two — China is surrounded by potential enemies.

 

Russia, Japan, and India are all neighbors … and historic adversaries. China's aggressive foreign policy targeting smaller states isn't encouraging submission but resistance, as countries such as The Philippines and Vietnam ally with the United States, Japan, and India.

 

China's other neighbors are weak or failed states, such as Pakistan and North Korea. Their instability — or their outright collapse — could have serious security repercussions for China, and help explain why Beijing lavishes funds on its armed forces.

 

Order of battle

 

 

China has the world's largest military, with no fewer than 2.3 million men and women in uniform. Another 800,000 people serve in China's reserves and militias.</p>The PLA ground forces number 1.25 million men and women divided into 18 group armies, each similar to an American corps. Each army consists of three to five infantry and mechanized divisions — China has only one tank division.

 

These ground troops are mostly for homeland defense. For power projection outside its borders, China has three airborne divisions, two marine divisions, and three marine brigades. Major equipment includes more than 7,000 tanks and 8,000 artillery pieces.

 

China's navy commands 255,000 sailors and 10,000 marines. The People's Liberation Army Navy is divided into the North, East, and South Seas Fleets, together possessing one aircraft carrier, 23 destroyers, 52 frigates, 49 diesel attack submarines, and five nuclear attack subs. China has at least three Jin-class ballistic missile submarines, representing Beijing's nuclear deterrent at sea.

 

The People's Liberation Army Air Force has 330,000 active personnel spread out over 150 air and naval aviation bases. The PLAAF and naval air arm of the PLAN together possess 1,321 fighter and attack aircraft — including hundreds of J-7s, pictured — plus 134 heavy bombers and tankers and 20 airborne early warning planes. China also operates more than 700 combat helicopters.

 

Unique to the PLA is the Second Artillery Corps, a separate branch of the military in charge of land-based conventional and nuclear missiles. The Second Artillery includes between 90,000 and 120,000 personnel divided into six missiles brigades.

 

The Second Artillery fields more than 1,100 conventional short-range ballistic missiles with ranges of 1,000 kilometers or less, another 300 or so conventional medium-range ballistic missiles, and an estimated 120 long-range nuclear ballistic missiles.

 

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimated China's 2013 defense budget at $188 billion dollars. That's about nine percent of global military spending and just under half of all spending in Asia. The same year, the United States spent $640 billion on defense, Russia $88 billion, India $47 billion, and Japan $48 billion.

 

Yes, China's spending seems like a lot. But it's not, really — especially considering how dangerous China's corner of the world can be.

 

Unenviable position

 

 

http://media.theweek.com/img/generic/ChineseMilitaryEmbed2.jpg(Feng Li/Getty Images)

 

It's probably difficult to walk through Beijing's most prosperous neighborhoods or Shanghai's glittering streets and grasp that you are in a country that borders three of the most unstable places in the world — Pakistan, Afghanistan, and North Korea.

 

After thousands of years of incursions and invasions, China has finally built up strong borders. Beijing is doing a good job of maintaining peace and relative prosperity in a rough, impoverished neighborhood.

 

"China's land borders have never been more secure than they are today," M. Taylor Fravel, an associate professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, told War is Boring.

 

"Although disputes with Bhutan and India remain, China no longer faces the prospect of a significant threat on land," Fravel continued. "Clashes could occur on the border with India, but they would be contained by geography and unlikely to escalate into a wider war."

 

This hasn't always been the case. Invaded by the Mongols, the Russians, Western colonialists, and most recently Japan, China suffered greatly at the hands of outsiders for millennia. Given this history, it makes sense that Beijing would want strong defenses.

 

Vietnam fought China in 1979 and killed 9,000 People's Liberation Army troops in a single month. Japan's occupation of China in the 1930s and '40s killed millions of Chinese. India fought China as recently as 1962. China and Russia waged a short, undeclared war in 1969.

 

China borders 14 countries, tying Russia for the most neighbors. But while many of Russia's neighbors are peaceful — Estonia, Finland, Norway, and Latvia come to mind — China borders Afghanistan, North Korea, Myanmar, and Pakistan. Two of these states have nuclear weapons.

 

North Korea is particularly dangerous. Not only does it practice diplomacy through spontaneous violence, it has nukes. Nobody knows when — or if — the North Korean government will collapse, but the idea of 24 million starving people suddenly finding themselves without a government is a frightening one for Beijing.

 

Last year we found out China has contingency plans to deal with a post-collapse North Korea. That would likely involve the PLA moving into North Korea to set up a buffer zone. Perhaps in reaction to this disclosure, Pyongyang described Beijing as a "turncoat and an enemy."

 

China is experiencing a prolonged period of peace and prosperity unprecedented in its modern history. At the same time, its neighborhood headaches are as numerous as ever. That's one good reason China's military budget is $188 billion a year and rising.

 

All alone

 

 

http://media.theweek.com/img/generic/ChineseMilitaryEmbed3.jpg(China Photos/Getty Images)

 

At the same time, China is remarkably lacking in real, dependable allies. In the Pacific alone, the United States can count Japan, Taiwan, Australia, South Korea, New Zealand, and The Philippines as close allies — and maintains cordial relations with others including Malaysia, Vietnam, and Indonesia.

 

China's list of allies in the Pacific, on the other hand, is a short one. Russia. Globally, China's allies include Pakistan, Zimbabwe, Venezuela, and the countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization — Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. All are despotic or near-despotic states, many are unstable and many have long records of human rights abuses.

 

Beijing embraces its worst neighbors in part to keep them in check. This worked with Pakistan, but failed with North Korea. In Myanmar, China cozied up with the oppressive military regime only for it to suddenly open up and seek ties with the West and Japan. China's net gain was years of condemnation for supporting the junta — which is to say, a net loss.

 

Where China has really failed, however, is in simply getting along with nearby countries. Before the recent confrontation with The Philippines over the Ayungin Shoal, relations between Manila and Beijing had never been better. The same went for much of Southeast Asia before China declared sovereignty over 90 percent of the South China Sea.

 

Even relations with Japan, China's historical enemy, were cordial if staid.

 

Sometime around 2010, Beijing decided to stop playing nice. China began pushing long-dormant territorial claims — and tried its hardest to split the alliance between Japan and the U.S. China's relations with pretty much every country in East and Southeast Asia have chilled.

 

It's hard to say what China really hoped to gain. Some argue that China is attempting to "Finlandize" smaller Asian states — that is, intimidate them into expressing neutrality in order to deny them to the Americans. Others argue that China wanted those disputed territories but also fundamentally has a problem with treating other countries as equals.

 

Whatever the case, China's recent actions have left it largely friendless. Today its most important relationships with other countries are strictly economic in nature.

 

This has obvious implications for China's military posture. While the U.S. Navy can sail across the Pacific and call on practically dozens of ports, China's warships can sail just outside its territorial waters and, other than the Russian port of Vladivostok, have nowhere to go.

 

This places China at an enormous strategic disadvantage. Beijing has no allies to provide bases, share burdens, pool intelligence, or lend moral support.

 

Race with inflation

 

 

http://media.theweek.com/img/generic/ChineseMilitaryEmbed4.jpg(ChinaFotoPress/Getty Images)

 

Since 1990, China's defense spending has swelled by at least 10 percent annually, resulting in a tenfold overall budget increase in just 24 years. Some observers point to China's seemingly huge military outlays as evidence of sinister intent.

 

But the budget boosts aren't nearly as big as they seem.

 

China's economic growth over the past two and a half decades has been meteoric, and has allowed the country to spend more on a modern military. But as a proportion of its economy, China's defense budget is in line with international norms.

 

And if you take into account inflation, China's real increase in defense spending is actually in the single digits annually — hardly the massive influx of cash that alarmists decry.

 

It's important to view China's arms spending in historical context. A quarter-century ago, Beijing's military was big and low-tech. In 1989, the PLA had 3.9 million people on its payroll — many of them leg infantry lacking vehicles and sophisticated weaponry. The army's main tank was a version of the Soviet T-55, a design dating to the early 1950s.

 

The air force and navy were capable only of coastal defense. China had a single nuclear missile submarine, which was rumored to have caught fire and sunk in port.

 

China was a poor country. Its GDP was $451 billion. By comparison, the USA's GDP in 1989 was $8.84 trillion. That year, Beijing spent $18.33 billion on defense. By comparison, the same year Japan spent $46.5 billion and tiny New Zealand, $1.8 billion.

 

China's 1989 defense budget amounted to spending $4,615 per soldier. At the same time, the United States appropriated $246,000 per individual service member.

 

In the late '80s, China's military doctrine still emphasized "People's War," a defensive strategy for drawing an enemy deep into the Chinese interior and then destroying him with conventional and guerrilla warfare. It was based on China's wartime experiences … and was totally inadequate.

 

In 1991, Beijing watched in shock and horror as a U.S.-led coalition easily smashed Saddam Hussein's Iraqi army and ejected it from Kuwait. An air campaign lasting several weeks and a ground offensive just 100 hours in duration destroyed a numerically superior Iraqi force.

 

Suddenly, China's large, impoverished military looked like a liability.

 

Beijing had a lot of work to do reforming its armed forces. That required money. The good news for China was that, thanks to a booming economy, it actually didn't have to devote a larger share of national output to defense in order to invest more in competent troops and modern weaponry.

 

One way to look at defense spending is as a percentage of GDP. China's major neighbors, with the exception of Japan, allocate more to their militaries as a percentage of their respective GDPs. India allocates 2.5 percent, South Korea 2.8 percent, and Russia 4.1 percent. The United States, with the best-equipped military on the planet, spends 3.8 percent of its GDP on defense.

 

The paradox of China's military budget is that spending has risen even as defense's share of the economy has dropped. As a percentage of the economy, China's arms spending has actually fallen by a little more than 20 percent. Beijing spent 2.6 percent of GDP on defense in 1989. Between 2002 and 2010, it appropriated an average of 2.1 percent. In 2013, China's military budget accounted for just two percent of GDP.

 

The PLA's slice of the economic pie has gotten smaller. It's just that the pie itself is much, much bigger than it was 25 years ago.

 

Public security

 

 

http://media.theweek.com/img/generic/ChineseMilitaryEmbed5.jpg(China Photos/Getty Images)

 

By some calculations, in 2013 China spent more on "public security" — Internet censorship, law enforcement, and the paramilitary People's Armed Police — than it did on external defense. China's internal security budget for 2014 is a secret, leading to speculation that once again, the Chinese Communist Party is spending more to defend itself from its own people than from other countries.

 

The Party knows what it's doing. Many Chinese are unhappy living under a totalitarian regime. Environmental damage, labor abuses, corruption and, land grabs can — and do — quickly escalate into riots.

 

On top of that, China must contend with low-level unrest in the far western province of Xinjiang — where ethnic Uighurs resent colonization by the rest of China — and in Tibet.

 

Under the status quo, China has no choice but to spend so heavily on public security. While that's bad for the Chinese people, it's actually a good thing for the region. Much of the military might that Beijing buys every year gets directed inward and never projects externally.

 

Matching U.S. military spending as a percentage of GDP would require China to spend 5.8 percent on internal and external defense. That's just not a realistic prospect. Only three countries devote that much of their economy to their armies — Saudi Arabia, Oman, and South Sudan.

 

Moreover, the dollars China does spend on external military force don't stretch as far as most observers assume. "Throughout much of the post-1978 reform era, the real-world effects of China's nominal defense spending have been mitigated heavily by rampant inflation," wrote Andrew Erickson, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College.

 

In 2008, China's spent 14.9 percent more on defense than it did in 2007. But that 14.9-percent increase coincided with 7.8-percent inflation, resulting in a net military-budget boost of only 7.1 percent. In 2010, defense spending rose 7.8 percent and was devoured by a 6.7-percent inflation rate, for a net gain of just 1.1 percent.

 

Adjusted for inflation, between 2004 and 2014, China's defense spending increased by an average of 8.3 percent in real terms. That's still a lot of money, particularly as defense spending has been falling in most of the West. But the PLA's budget isn't really growing by double digits, as many alarmists claim.

 

PLA, Inc. and the 'rank factory'

 

 

http://media.theweek.com/img/generic/ChineseMilitaryEmbed6.jpg(Guang Niu/Getty Images)

 

Corruption is a huge and largely invisible problem for the PLA. Officials sell government property for their own profit. Contractors charge inflated fees for substandard work. Cronyism results in promotions for unqualified personnel.

 

For years, the PLA generated extra income — and food staples — by farming and raising its own livestock. As China's economy took off, these survival efforts evolved into businesses. To farming and ranching, the PLA added hotels, theaters, and bars — the profits from which as often as not ended up in top officers' pockets.

 

In 1998, the Chinese Communist Party ordered the PLA to cut ties with commercial enterprises in order to improve military readiness. An infantry unit didn't need to raise its own pork anymore — the defense budget could accommodate soldiers' food needs. Units could get on with the business of soldiering.

 

But instead of ending them, corrupt military leaders simply obscured their profit ventures.

 

The business of illegally selling military license plates to wealthy civilians has been a particularly lucrative one. Plate bearers — who are often civilians with only tangential connections to the PLA — mount red lights and sirens on their cars to push through regular street traffic. Holders are often entitled to free gasoline.

 

The situation got so bad that in 2013, the PLA banned expensive imports — from Mercedes-Benz, BMW, Porsche, and Bentley — from having military license plates.

 

Beijing has occasionally cracked down on corrupt officers. In 2007, a judge handed down a suspended death sentence to Vice Adm. Wang Shouye for embezzling $25 million in PLA funds.

 

As deputy director of the PLA's General Logistics Department between 1997 and 2001, Wang was in a position to approve new military housing. The government accused Wang of receiving kickbacks from contractors.

 

Police arrested Wang in 2006 after the admiral refused blackmail demands from one of his many mistresses. Investigators found more than $8 million dollars stashed in microwave ovens and refrigerators in Wang's homes in Beijing and Nanjing and another $2.5 million in a washing machine. There was evidence of an additional $8 million in pilfered funds in Wang's bank accounts.

 

In March, police detained Xu Caihou, a retired general and former member of the powerful Central Military Commission, on allegations he made millions of dollars selling military ranks. Xu was in charge of high-level army promotions from 2004 to 2013.

 

We don't know exactly how much money Xu made. However, the general's subordinate Gu Junshan — who is also in custody and under investigation — gave Xu's daughter a debit card worth $3.2 million as a wedding gift.

 

Gu reportedly sold "hundreds" of military ranks. "If a senior colonel [not in line for promotion] wanted to become a major general, he had to pay up to $4.8 million," a source told Reuters.

 

That's a lot of money. In most professional militaries, such bribes wouldn't be worth it. But in the PLA, a payoff like that is an investment. The higher an officer's rank, the greater the opportunities for self-enrichment.

 

Daniel Hartnett, a China analyst at CNA Corporation, told War Is Boring that corruption could damage the PLA's military capabilities, not the least by "hinder[ing] the PLA's ability to develop its officer corps."

 

"If officers are purchasing promotions, as recent allegations have claimed, it could mean that those who should be promoted due to merit might not be. And those that arebeing promoted, shouldn't necessarily be," Hartnett said.

 

Graft could hurt the PLA in other ways, Hartnett explained. "Although PLA procurement processes are often a black box, it'd be a plausible conclusion that some — maybe even many — procurement decisions are not necessarily made with the PLA's best interests in mind. Purchase this item, and receive a kickback, even if that item is sub-quality or not necessarily need."

 

Corruption could also open a rift between the Chinese people and the PLA. "If the military is seen as a corrupt institution, as it was during the early 1980s in China, overall support for the PLA could be undermined," Hartnett said. "This would go heavily against the military's narrative that it is the keeper of [Chinese] honor and integrity that it has worked so hard to develop over the past two-plus decades."

 

Morale in the PLA officer corps has tanked in the wake of the Gu Junshan scandal, According to Reuters. "Many fear punishment. Those who are able but passed over for promotion are disgruntled."

 

Since assuming office in 2013, Chinese president Xi Jinping has made the news several times urging the PLA to "prepare for combat." That might sound bellicose, but in light of the PLA's corruption problem, Xi could be telling officers to stop making money and just do their jobs.

 

"No country can defeat China," a leading PLA commissar wasquoted as saying in Foreign Policy. "Only our own corruption can destroy us and cause our armed forces to be defeated without fighting."

 

Museum pieces

 

 

http://media.theweek.com/img/generic/ChineseMilitaryEmbed7.jpg(China Photos/Getty Images)

 

Despite a growing defense budget, China's arsenals still overflow with outdated equipment. The PLA possesses 7,580 main battle tanks — more than the U.S. Army. But only 450 of those tanks — the Type 98As and Type 99s — are anywhere near modern, with 125-millimeter guns, composite armor, modern suspension, and advanced fire control systems.

 

All of America's roughly 5,000 M-1 tanks are modern.

 

The other 7,130 Chinese tanks — some of which are pictured here — are the same descendants of Soviet T-55s that comprised Beijing's armored force in the late 1980s … and were obsolete even then.

 

China also has a lot of fighter planes. Between the People's Liberation Army Air Force and the air arm of the People's Liberation Army Navy, China boasts no fewer than 1,321 fighter aircraft, an aerial armada only slightly smaller than America's.

 

But China's air forces likewise maintain mostly obsolete jets. Of 1,321 fighters, only 502 are modern — 296 variants of the Russian Su-27 and 206 J-10s of an indigenous design. The remaining 819 fighters — mostly J-7s, J-8s and Q-5s — are 1960s designs built in the 1970s. They wouldn't last long in a shooting war.

 

The navy is in the best shape, but that's not saying much. The PLAN's destroyers and frigates are fairly new, but its first aircraft carrier Liaoning is a rebuilt Soviet ship from the 1980s. After a nine-year refit, Liaoning started sea trials in 2011.

 

Liaoning is half the size of an American Nimitz-class supercarrier and carries half as many planes. As Liaoning lacks a catapult, China's J-15 naval fighters must use a ski ramp to take off — and that limits their payload and range. Liaoning lacks the radar and refueling planes that give American flattops their long-range striking power.

 

Submarines are another problem area for the PLAN. Just over half of China's 54 submarines are modern — that is, built within the last 20 years. Beijing's modern undersea fleet includes the Shang, Han, Yuan, and Song classes. All four classes are Chinese-built. All are markedly inferior to Western designs.

 

The rest of China's submarines, especially its 1980s-vintage Mings, are totally obsolete.

 

The PLAN halted production of the nuclear-powered Shang class after only building just three boats — an ominous sign. Moreover, Beijing has placed an order with Russia for up to four Kalina-class subs, signalling a lack of faith in local designs.

 

Unknown unknowns

 

 

http://media.theweek.com/img/generic/ChineseMilitaryEmbed8.jpg(Guang Niu/Getty Images)

 

One of the most visible signs of China's military rise is all the new, locally-designed and -produced hardware. Beijing is building new ships, aircraft, drones and tanks that, on the outside, appear to be matches for Western weapons. But we know very little about China's homemade weaponry. Specifically, we don't know if any of it really works.

 

In an early effort to modernize the PLA, in the 1980s China strengthened ties with Western defense contractors. Beijing bought helicopters, aircraft, engines, naval electronics, and munitions. Then, in 1989, the Chinese government massacred pro-democracy students near Tiananmen Square in the heart of Beijing. The U.S. and Europe promptly imposed an arms embargo.

 

China turned to Russia, but Russia would rather sell finished products to China than help its neighbor develop its own industry. Beijing realized it would have to develop weaponry all on its own.

 

That's not easy. In all the world, only the United States still has the technology, expertise, and industrial capacity to develop all of its own military hardware. It's very, very expensive.

 

Many of China's "new" weapons are actually foreign designs that Beijing's state companies have licensed, stolen, or painstakingly reverse-engineered. The Changhe Z-8 helicopter was originally the French Super Frelon. The Harbin Z-9 scout helicopter started life as the Eurocopter Dauphin. The Type 99 tank is an updated Soviet T-72.

 

To be sure, not all of the PLA's new hardware is a knock-off. But "homemade" does not necessarily equal "good." In many cases, we can only guess at the weapon's quality. After all, China has no free press.

 

The J-20 stealth fighter prototype, for example, has flown scores of test flights since first appearing in late 2010. The large, angular plane appears to boast long range and a large payload, but its stealthiness is hard to gauge. Its avionics, aerodynamic controls, weapons, and sensors — and especially its engines — are equally questionable.

 

The J-20's designers appear to be waiting on new, Chinese-developed engines to replace the prototype's Russian-made AL-31Ns. China has been working on those engines, without visible success, since the early 1990s.

 

It's important to remember that America's latest F-35 Joint Strike Fighter first flew in 2006 and won't be ready for combat until 2016. The United States has experience developing stealth fighters; China does not. If we allow China 10 years from first flight to combat readiness, the J-20 won't be a front-line fighter until 2021. At the earliest.

 

The specifications of the PLAN's Type 052C/D air-defense destroyers make them seem very similar to Western warships, such as the U.K.'s Darings or the American Arleigh Burkes. But we don't know how difficult the ships were to build, how well their air-defense system works with the associated phased-array radar or how accurate and reliable the ships' missiles are.

 

When it comes to developing arms, China is starting out far behind Russia and the West and is struggling to catch up. And we must not forget that the very government developing all this hardware is also the only source of information about the new gear. For now, it's wise to be skeptical of Chinese weaponry.

 

Neighborhood watch

 

 

http://media.theweek.com/img/generic/ChineseMilitaryEmbed9.jpg(Guang Niu/Pool/Getty Images)

 

China's aggressive behavior, in the East and South China Seas has prompted many of its neighbors to band together or seek the support of larger, more powerful allies. Japan is the hub for many of these of these cooperative agreements.

 

Politically and constitutionally limited in what kind of direct action it can take to counter China, Japan is building relationships with China's other disgruntled neighbors and with Western powers. Tokyo is currently in talks with Australia, the U.K., India, Indonesia, The Philippines, Vietnam, Canada, and the U.S.

 

Logistics cooperation, co-development of military equipment, intelligence sharing, joint exercises, and security-related aid are all on the table.

 

Vietnam, a historical enemy of China, has begun building a military specifically tailored to counter the PLA. It has procured Russian Su-27 and Su-30 fighters and four Gepard frigates. Vietnam has even bought its first submarines — six Improved Kilo diesel-electrics from Russia that are more advanced than the Chinese navy's own Kilos.

 

Hanoi is strengthening foreign ties. India will train Vietnam's submariners. Vietnam has also hinted at letting foreign fleets use the harbor at Cam Ranh Bay, but is likely holding back as that would be a serious provocation to China.

 

The Philippines, locked in a standoff with China over the Ayungin Shoal, has begun rebuilding its navy and air force, purchasing retired U.S. Coast Guard cutters for its navy and a dozen South Korean TA-50 light fighters for the air force. Manila has agreed to host American facilities — and American troops — on its military bases.

 

Asia probably won't assemble a new NATO-like alliance in the near future. China's opponents aren't willing to accept such close military integration. Most are unwilling to fight for someone else. Many of these countries, despite being wary of Chinese aggression, still have strong economic ties to Beijing.

 

Still, the level of cooperation would complicate any military moves by China. Not that Beijing necessarily intends to invade … anyone. Ever. Military, diplomatic and economic power are intertwined forces that enable a government to shape its environment — peacefully and against a rival's will.

 

The big question is, when does China catch up to America militarily?

 

Never.

 

"China will grow old before it gets rich" is, by now, a cliche among China-watchers. But it's true. The same demographic wave that has gifted China with an abundance of labor will soon also transform the country into the world's biggest retirement home.

 

Beijing's "one-child" policy has sharpened the trend. Today China has 16 retirees per 100 workers. Projections see that increasing to 64 retirees per 100 workers by 2050, resulting a much grayer population than in America.

 

This has indirect — but serious — implications for China's defense. Most Chinese do not have retirement benefits and in their old age must rely on personal savings or family … a difficult proposition when there is only one child to take care of two parents.

 

If Beijing wants to preserve household savings and productivity, it will have to build some kind of social welfare system. And that means making some difficult choices.

 

China's borders are secure. The U.S., Japan, and India cannot bring down the Chinese government. But tens of millions of desperate Chinese families could do so — and just might, if Beijing can't find some way to care for them as they age.

 

China has nuclear weapons. It's ruled by a deeply nationalistic, authoritarian regime with a history of brutality towards its own citizens. It has territorial claims that clash with those of other countries — and a defense budget rising by 8 percent annually. It's wise to keep a watchful eye on China.

 

Yet China is a hobbled giant with many deep, systemic problems. Some of these problems — particularly the technological ones — are solvable. The demographic issue is not. And it's the biggest reason the paper dragon does not pose a major threat to the rest of the world over the long term.

 

From drones to AKs, high technology to low politics, War is Boring explores how and why we fight above, on, and below an angry world. Sign up for its daily email update here or subscribe to its RSS Feed here.

 

 

 

 

 

 

[camiar]

They're selling us again the idea of reviving the Southeast-Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) or a larger Pan-Asian equivalent.

 

http://asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/Geopolitico/Anders-Corr-China-threat-requires-an-Asian-NATO

 

Anders Corr: China threat requires an Asian NATO

 

"...The increasing belligerence of China in the East and South China seas, and towards India, has fundamentally destabilized the security dynamics of Asia. Japan is seeking a closer alliance with India, and is likely seeking advanced offensive weapons from the U.S. Vietnam is considering a U.S. alliance. China increasingly makes common cause with Russia, using unethical and illegal practices in trade and geopolitics.

 

While existing bilateral alliances go partway towards defending against the resurgent autocratic threat, only a formalized multilateral treaty organization would provide the coordination necessary to defend democracy and international law in Asia against emerging threats. To survive, Asian democracies must create what might be called an Asian Treaty Organization, patterned after the successful North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Europe and North America..."

 

 

I have a different idea.

 

"The only way to eliminate an enemy is to make him your friend."