The Art of War

[skitz]

Yes. Yes. My thoughts exactly. The US can NOT be defeated (or invaded). The best that Nagumo can hope for is dig in at Midway, re-supply, and merely POSTURE an impending invasion of Hawaii. Psychologically (because of the hypothetical rout in Midway), this is enough of a leverage to (maybe) negotiate a peace from a position of strength. Problem of the USA is democracy. The US President is not an Emperor who can command his people to die for him, even when he knows he is holding all the aces (and the a-bomb on his backpocket anytime soon).

[TheSmilingBandit]

before may narecieved akong email. about sa surender ng japan. the emperor planned another way to invade. by the use of economic and tecnological strategy. in 40 years they will able to invade not only every country but every households. philippines will be their raw material country. anyway once na nakita ko ulit paste ko dito. good topic anyway.

Actually, I believe that it was the Indochina-Malaysia-Indonesia area that Japan really wanted since they are even more resource rich than the Philippines, that was termed the Southern Resource Zone by the Imperial War Ministry. The Northern Resource Zone being Siberia.

 

The Huks were defeated by the combined efforts of Ramon Magsaysay as the DND secretary and the disciplinarian officer Col Napoleon Valeriano of the famed "Nenita Unit" which went after the the Huks until they captured Huk supremo Luis Taruc. Hindi pa masyadong corrupt and military nuon unlike what they are now.

Well technically, the remnants of the Huks became the CPP-NPA. As far as the Nenita units, they were basically death-squads and sowed more hate towards the government, probably extending the Huk movement by a decade for their indiscriminate actions.

 

Feel free to challenge this choice of mine but I think no superpower in the ancient world (pre-gunpowder era) could beat the Mongols. Be it Hannibal, Alexander the Great, Caesar, etc.

the mongols conquered basically a large swath of no-man's-land between the pacific and near east (plus some parts of europe.) the only real power centers they were able to conquer were china and kwaraizem (afghanistan/pakistan to persia.) they wer far from conquering the real power centers in europe. the most powerful center at the time of the mongols was constantinople. they were nowhere near to conquering that. in western europe, they reached poland and parts of germany. but the strongest army was farther to the west --france. across the channel was an even stronger field force.

The unrivaled (at the time) mobility and coordination of the Mongol Hordes (the term Hordes by the way comes from the Mongolian word Hordu ... basically meaning army corps ... roughly 20,000 to 50,000 soldiers) would have cut a swath against almost any force they came up against in my humble opinion.

 

The empire they built extended from Korea (in the East) to Bulgaria (in the West), by the time their armies were on the way to Europe (circa 1230ad) the three strongest kingdoms would have been the Holy Roman Empire (Frederick II), France (Louis IX aka St. Louis), and England (Henry III).

 

Now Frederick II had won several battles, but at the highest point of his career (the 6th Crusade) was about 40,000 troops (including the contingents of the Teutonic Knights, the Knights Hospitallers, and the Knights Templars), though he did succeed in regaining control of Jerusalem, it was done by diplomatic rather than military means, and within 5 years of the ending of the truce, it was once more lost. The reason that the Sultan of Egypt even agreed to the truce was because he was busy fighting rebellion.

 

Louis IX was a very kind and pious king, that said, he was also an inept military leader, much the same could be said about Henry III.

 

Assuming that the forces of the 3 kingdoms would have even been marshalled together, and that their lack of supplies didn't k*ll them, they could have mustered perhaps some 300,000 troops, most of whom would be serf levies (this was still before the heyday of the English longbowmen) with perhaps some 30,000 well armed and trained knights and some 90,000 armed and trained men-at-arms. Add in the various smaller states such as Spain, Burgundy, the various Italian city-states, Poland, Hungary, and the fighting men of the North (for some reason if they help) and those numbers could be inflated up, with a general arriere-ban (total war footing) and stripping off the peasant levies from the fields, perhaps some 800,000 troops could be generated, of which some 50,000 would be knights (heavy cavalry), some 120,000 would be mounted men-at-arms (including mercenaries), perhaps some 20,000-30,000 light cavalry (various tribes), some 150,000 men-at-arms (crossbowmen/spearmen), and the rest would be about 450,000 barely armored, untrained field levies with makeshift weaponry.

 

Now the Mongols sent in 3 armies into Europe perhaps some 120,000 superbly trained and iron-disciplined troops, well-equipped and armored, with more than adequate supplies with a mobility that would allow them to run rings around the heavy cavalry of Europe. If necessary, Genghis Khan could have sent up to an additional 150,000 men. We can't just compare numbers since in the battle of Mohi (as an example, some 80,000 European knights, mounted men-at-arms, and light cavalry faced up against 70,000 Mongol warriors. By all accounts, it was a massacre, more than half the Europeans died while Mongol casualties numbered under 1,000.

 

The only thing that saved Europe was the death of Gengis Khan.

 

I enjoy reading this thread! Though I am not as astute as you guys are but I am a big "fan" of war history nonetheless (I have old copies of "Armchair General" ). Anyway if I can just challenge you a little with a what if:

 

The Battle of Midway was won by the Japanese (it could have gone either way, luck was simply on the American side). Nagumo conquered Midway with still half his forces intact. And the Americans losing all carriers (they went for it, and lost everything). The only thing standing between the Japanese Navy and the American west coast is the big Pacific Ocean and a few American ships (no carriers).

 

If you are Nagumo, would you go for it? Can you invade mainland USA? It takes around 3-4 years to build a carrier from scratch. Now is the perfect time to strike before the full industrial might of America comes to bear. You hear too that they are trying to develop a bomb that will harness the power of the stars. If you are going to go for it, now is the perfect time! Mainland USA? Total victory or nothing? How would you do it?

 

-----------------

 

Let me fill in some details for the computation OC guys (I say that with affection ). It's one week after the first engagement and you compute that Nagumo lost half his invasion force (just cut it right in the middle, carriers, and support ships). Midway is 100% Japanese controlled. Nimitz's intercepting force is wiped out (completely). All other ships from Japan and the USA (not involved in the battle) is still in play.

BTW, I would really be interested with your opinion (and SmilingBandit's) on how the IJN can push the war to mainland USA had they won the Battle of Midway (with plenty to spare, as they had planned). Is it even possible? IMHO, it is not even possible. A logistical nightmare. Distance being the biggest obstacle. All the Japanese could ever hope for is to negotiate for peace from the position of strength. I'd get the IJN to posture an invasion of Hawai (not even attemt to haul the entire IJN to California), never actually doing it (too much burden to hold), then quickly negotiate a peace. Even if Nagumo had routed the Americans in Midway, the Americans simply can not be defeated in that theater of war. Unless of course, Nazi Germany can keep the Americans tied up in that other theater.

there's absolutely no way they can carry the mid-ocean battle all the way to hawaii, even if they had sunk the three american carriers. they simply didn't have enough fuel, spare planes and pilots. the amricans were busy constucting two modern battleships in time for guadalcanal. two fleet carriers were nearing completion, and the eastern shipyards were already gearing to roll out one escort carrier every 2 weeks. the US navy and army air corp can train at least 30 competent pilots every month.

 

so an attack at the mainland, hawaii or even australia is a long shot. to invade continental US, they will have to make a strategic withdrawal, stockpile on fueland muniations, and match the amercans in tersm of arms production. they will have to completely destroy the US' two-ocean fleet. and then, waiting for them on US soil is at least 20 army divisions and more than 1 million reservists willing to fight. tall order for any other country in the world at the time.

 

consider: the US, with its overwhelming productive and human advantage, waited till 1944 to really push towards japan and consider invasion (also, they were forcusing their war efforts on a much more dangerous germany.) before that, the US had to make sure production was rolling continuously, and that the greater part of japanese naval power was no longer a serious factor.

Yes. Yes. My thoughts exactly. The US can NOT be defeated (or invaded). The best that Nagumo can hope for is dig in at Midway, re-supply, and merely POSTURE an impending invasion of Hawaii. Psychologically (because of the hypothetical rout in Midway), this is enough of a leverage to (maybe) negotiate a peace from a position of strength. Problem of the USA is democracy. The US President is not an Emperor who can command his people to die for him, even when he knows he is holding all the aces (and the a-bomb on his backpocket anytime soon).

An interesting conundrum, I don't think that even Yamamoto believed that Japan could win the war against the US, in fact, all he was after is a short 1 or 2 year war, concluding in a truce that would allow Japan to retain the Southern Resource Zone. If they had won at Midway, the US would have been reduced to only the Wasp (basically a baby carrier) and the Saratoga. Japan should have immediately aimed for Hawaii, using off-shore bombardment they could have had the military governor of the islands surrender (much as like what happened in the Philippines), cutting of supplies to MacArthur's southern line. Using such a victory, they could "threaten" much of the West Coast with attacks via naval bombardment or carrier planes, without actually doing so, while their diplomats in Mexico could arrange for a truce. With the need to rebuild the Pacific Fleet, many of the lend-lease ships ferrying supplies to battered England would have to be put on hold. Perhaps, a victory at Midway would have been enough to drive the US into signing a truce, on the other hand, the Americans at the time still had a fierce patriotism not commonly found today.

 

The US could have abandoned the various territories of the Philippine Islands, the Hawaiian Islands, Midway, and Guam, as none of them were states. With the use of the naval facilities of Pearl Harbor, the IJN would have had a lock on the mid-Pacific area.

 

Still, in my opinion, America would have sued for peace had they lost Midway and Hawaii.

 

As an aside, Harry Turtledove wrote a couple of books about this called the Days of Infamy series, pretty much posturing a total defeat for the US Pacific Fleet and an invasion of Hawaii.

Edited December 30, 2009 by TheSmilingBandit

[Guest megalodon]

@smilingbandit

 

The Mongols didn't need to bring supplies. They drank blood from their horses and ate them if need be. At the same time, they toyed with their opponents by sometimes sending them on a wild goose chase then after days of pursuit by their enemies, they would turn back to face them and annihilate them. In terms of cavalry tactics, the Mongols were the best at that point in time. They would have routed any European power. I believe Genghis Khan's cavalry tactics are taught in prestigious military schools like Westpoint and Sandhurst.

[TheSmilingBandit]

The Mongols didn't need to bring supplies. They drank blood from their horses and ate them if need be.

Actually they normally drank the milk that the mares produce. Each trooper would have up to 4 or 5 remounts, all of which were mares, thus they could milk the mares for milk which is kept in horsehide bags and tied to the saddle to ferment resulting in a slightly sour drink that is lightly alcoholic and has a high nutritional value. In addition they lived off the land, collecting all animals in the area, they prize killing cattle since they slice the meat into fairly thick chunks that they then put under their saddle, the meat is tenderized by the bouncing of the trooper during the day's travels, an Arban (10 soldiers) could live off 1 cattle for the entire week, supplemented by the Kumiss (the fermented mares milk), if necessary, the Mongol troopers could even live entirely off Kumiss for a week.

 

However, as a general rule, each Tumen (10,000 troopers) would have their families traveling with them, even during times of invasion (that is when the Mongols were invading others.) The families would often be in the rear, or in cases of a Hordu (2 to 5 tumens operating together), then the families move combined. This helps inspire morale since the troopers can't just break ranks and flee, not with their families in much slower wagons. The other thing about having families is that most of the time, these non-combatants would be the ones gathering grains and livestock, killing them and turning them into usable items. A cow for example has the hide stripped off to help make saddles or boots or pants or tents. The hooves are melted and used as a glue to help make arrows. The softer cuts of meat is smoked and sent with the troopers, made more tender by the pounding of the hooves of the mares as they sit under the saddle and above the saddle blanket. The tougher cuts of meat is dried and ground up, then packaged into long lasting rations that just need to be added to boiling water, sort of a primitive version of instant soups.

 

So yes, while the Mongol trooper can indeed live without supplies, for a longer period than his European or even Middle Eastern counterparts, he still relies on a very well organized, traveling supply chain.

 

At the same time, they toyed with their opponents by sometimes sending them on a wild goose chase then after days of pursuit by their enemies, they would turn back to face them and annihilate them.

This mobility and long-distance coordination was unparalleled at the time, causing most of their foes to assume that Mongol armies were anywhere from 3x to 10x bigger than they actually were which is why the term Hordes means vast number in English.

 

In terms of cavalry tactics, the Mongols were the best at that point in time. They would have routed any European power. I believe Genghis Khan's cavalry tactics are taught in prestigious military schools like Westpoint and Sandhurst.

I agree, they would have routed any European power they faced at the time. However, in a straight out head on battle (something they avoided, preferring to attack from flanks and the rears of the enemies, or even bypassing them entirely), the heavier armored knights with their massive war destriers would have made mincemeat of any Mongol trooper dumb enough to stand in their way (not that they would have.)

[bekim]

Well technically, the remnants of the Huks became the CPP-NPA. As far as the Nenita units, they were basically death-squads and sowed more hate towards the government, probably extending the Huk movement by a decade for their indiscriminate actions.

 

[/color][/size][/font][/i]

 

 

This is the first time I heard somebody call the "Nenita Unit" as a death squad, they were so far the most disciplined unit created within the AFP after the war. For a starter ,no one is accepted or kept in the unit if his waistline is more than 34". The name of the unit was taken after the name of a woman who was rape tortured and killed by the Huks. If you are talking of death squads in the Central Luzon baka you are talking of the "Monkeys" and the "Beatles" (one is pro government and the other one is leftist, I just can't remember which is which), but they operated in the 60's and not in the 50's during the time of the Nenita Unit. As for the Huks turning into the CPP NPA mukhang hindi ganuon iyon. Luis Taruc of the Huks was never a fan of "Amado Guerrero" who started the CPP NPA movement. The Huks were originally a guerilla movement against the Japanese kaya nga ang pangalan eh.."Hukbalahap or Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Japones" but started to fight the government when their demand for payment for their services against the Japanese was not met by the government after the war.

[TheSmilingBandit]

This is the first time I heard somebody call the "Nenita Unit" as a death squad, they were so far the most disciplined unit created within the AFP after the war. For a starter ,no one is accepted or kept in the unit if his waistline is more than 34". The name of the unit was taken after the name of a woman who was rape tortured and killed by the Huks. If you are talking of death squads in the Central Luzon baka you are talking of the "Monkeys" and the "Beatles" (one is pro government and the other one is leftist, I just can't remember which is which), but they operated in the 60's and not in the 50's during the time of the Nenita Unit. As for the Huks turning into the CPP NPA mukhang hindi ganuon iyon. Luis Taruc of the Huks was never a fan of "Amado Guerrero" who started the CPP NPA movement. The Huks were originally a guerilla movement against the Japanese kaya nga ang pangalan eh.."Hukbalahap or Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Japones" but started to fight the government when their demand for payment for their services against the Japanese was not met by the government after the war.

You do realize that the Huks were the fighting arm of the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (a Marxist-Lenist group), an organization Taruc joined in 1935. The PKP is the forerunner of the CPP (which were Maoists) while the Huks were the forerunners of the NPA.

 

As for the Nenitas, they operated from mid 1946 to late 1949 as the local version of the death squads of South America. I think you are probably referring to the multiple Army units that operated in the 50s with a "hearts and minds" campaign as the disciplined units.

[TheSmilingBandit]

Its a new year, so let's see if we can refresh this thread a little.

 

In a what-if scenario, let's say that the British crown never lost their North American colonies (i.e. that the 13 colonies did not go into revolt), how would that have impacted in the major wars following that era, let's say the Napoleonic Wars and the Crimean War?

 

Assuming that the butterfly effect did not wipe out the renowned officers and generals of the colonies and that with the expansion into Amerindian territories proceeding forthwith, and that the British crown would recognize and ennoble those who have distinguished themselves in the Vice-Royalty of the North Americas.

 

With the assistance of the manpower of the North Americas and access to minds and generalship of General Sir Winfield Scott and General Sir Andrew Jackson and their like, could the British have defeated Napoleon faster and perhaps imposed their control over the French?

 

With the aid of General Sir Robert Lee, General Sir James Ewell Brown Stuart, and their like how would the Crimean War have been different?

[macbolan00]

your scenario does not have much variance on production and logistics as today. as for US-UK relations, it has never been seriously threatened since WW1.

 

what i do know is that in the years before august 1914, west europeand countries, along with the US and commonwealth nations were close to entering a one-on-one war many times. the span-am war was just one "hot example."

[TheSmilingBandit]

your scenario does not have much variance on production and logistics as today. as for US-UK relations, it has never been seriously threatened since WW1.

 

what i do know is that in the years before august 1914, west europeand countries, along with the US and commonwealth nations were close to entering a one-on-one war many times. the span-am war was just one "hot example."

I meant that for example, if the American Revolution never occurred and that instead King George III had been a more reasonable man who turned his North American possessions into the Vice-Royalty of North America. The spread to the west from the Eastern seaboard occurs on time, and that the vitality of the colonialists would be harnessed by the English Commonwealth.

 

That instead of sapping English strength from the Napoleonic Wars with the War of 1812, the Americans would and could instead have sent their own reinforcements, most likely under Winfield Scott.

[macbolan00]

hmmm... spent time thinking of that. first, it doesn't make much sense to regret not having a historical figure at your side. any developed country has its fair share of "geniuses-in-waiting." in many cases, countries have too many talents elbowing each other at the top, often with negative results. the three russian top commanders during the final drive to berlin is one example. the western command with the likes of ike, monty, brad and george is probably the best example of what i'm saying. over at the pacific, all roosevelt had to do was toss a coin: will it be nimitz or macarthur who will lead the drive?

 

with regard to logistic support, we've seen how solid the commonwealth and even the allied coalition can be, so having a contiguous political influence over all territories isn't much of an advantage (think russia during world war 1.) what's important is you have the major industrial and population centers on your side. you'll be hard to beat in such as case.

 

lastly, the UK was as rich as a superpower can be going into world war 1. but see how the war bled it dry.

[TheSmilingBandit]

hmmm... spent time thinking of that. first, it doesn't make much sense to regret not having a historical figure at your side. any developed country has its fair share of "geniuses-in-waiting." in many cases, countries have too many talents elbowing each other at the top, often with negative results. the three russian top commanders during the final drive to berlin is one example. the western command with the likes of ike, monty, brad and george is probably the best example of what i'm saying. over at the pacific, all roosevelt had to do was toss a coin: will it be nimitz or macarthur who will lead the drive?

 

with regard to logistic support, we've seen how solid the commonwealth and even the allied coalition can be, so having a contiguous political influence over all territories isn't much of an advantage (think russia during world war 1.) what's important is you have the major industrial and population centers on your side. you'll be hard to beat in such as case.

 

lastly, the UK was as rich as a superpower can be going into world war 1. but see how the war bled it dry.

I was actually speaking of the latter quarter of the 1700s and the first half of the 1800s, pretty much pre-Industrial Revolution era. Many, if not most, of the European nations had aristocratic officer corps, most of whom were pretty lousy generals (see Lord Cardigan, Lord Raglan), come to think about it, lots of American generals were also pretty insipid.

[bekim]

You do realize that the Huks were the fighting arm of the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (a Marxist-Lenist group), an organization Taruc joined in 1935. The PKP is the forerunner of the CPP (which were Maoists) while the Huks were the forerunners of the NPA.

 

As for the Nenitas, they operated from mid 1946 to late 1949 as the local version of the death squads of South America. I think you are probably referring to the multiple Army units that operated in the 50s with a "hearts and minds" campaign as the disciplined units.

 

This is what it was as related to me by someone who was there during the period. A retired social studies and history professor in a college in Manila he was 17 years old and barely out of high school when he together with other young men and women joined the Huks in '42-45.... "The young men and women who joined the Huks in '42-45 were not communist, sila Luis Taruc & Jesus Lava lang and their familes ang mga Marxist-Lennist. Most of those who joined are even "little brown Americans" who joined the guerilla movement to harass the Japanese to pave the way for the return of Uncle Sam and not for the "praise and glory" of the communist movement. Towards the end of the war they became disgrunted when they realized that they were being "packaged" as communist guerillas. Afraid that the "red tag" will cause them their "guerilla recognition" and "backpay" they broke ranks and joined the other guerilla groups so that they can be listed in their roster of members. Those who were unable to do so did have problems with their "backpay claims" in 1946 and "revolted". That revolt was for their back pay and not for the communist ideology kaya nga ang daling natalo eh, but writers with certain agenda wrote history with "red" in mind", so that's what you young guys are now reading".

Edited January 12, 2010 by bekim

[TheSmilingBandit]

This is what it was as related to me by someone who was there during the period. A retired social studies and history professor in a college in Manila he was 17 years old and barely out of high school when he together with other young men and women joined the Huks in '42-45.... "The young men and women who joined the Huks in '42-45 were not communist, sila Luis Taruc & Jesus Lava lang and their familes ang mga Marxist-Lennist. Most of those who joined are even "little brown Americans" who joined the guerilla movement to harass the Japanese to pave the way for the return of Uncle Sam and not for the "praise and glory" of the communist movement. Towards the end of the war they became disgrunted when they realized that they were being "packaged" as communist guerillas. Afraid that the "red tag" will cause them their "guerilla recognition" and "backpay" they broke ranks and joined the other guerilla groups so that they can be listed in their roster of members. Those who were unable to do so did have problems with their "backpay claims" in 1946 and "revolted". That revolt was for their back pay and not for the communist ideology kaya nga ang daling natalo eh, but writers with certain agenda wrote history with "red" in mind", so that's what you young guys are now reading".

Tales were also told to me by my elders about this period, and while the rank and file may not have truly been communist at heart, their leaders were.

 

Thank you for calling me a young guy. :thumbsupsmiley:

[logandakma]

My dad told me of tales of "guerillang manok" who really were not guerillyeros but were able to collect backpays. I remember his story of a "dynamite fisherman" who lost his right hand when the dynamite he was about to throw to the sea exploded in his hand. After the war he got himself listed as a guerillyero and claimed he lost his hand in combat with the Japs. Nagi siyang pensionado until his death.

[TheSmilingBandit]

My dad told me of tales of "guerillang manok" who really were not guerillyeros but were able to collect backpays. I remember his story of a "dynamite fisherman" who lost his right hand when the dynamite he was about to throw to the sea exploded in his hand. After the war he got himself listed as a guerillyero and claimed he lost his hand in combat with the Japs. Nagi siyang pensionado until his death.

 

Well, what can I say, lots of people are genuine a$$holes.

 

Speaking of such, in the opinion of my fellow chairborne brigade members, do you guys believe that Patton was truly deranged or was he just acting?

[Sigmundo]

I'd say he is part megalomaniac and brilliant commander

[pilot13]

Megalomaniac -- no, Patton was just too aggressive for the British to handle (i.e. during the Normandy invasion he wanted to quickly eliminate a German pocket but Montgomery was too cautious), but Eisenhower always had a leash on him.

Regards the slapping incident, I think he was part of the Old School of doing things...

He's just flashy for the cameras and for the Germans....

 

Brilliant commander -- yes, he's a tactical and logistical genius during the Bulge. :thumbsupsmiley:

[macbolan00]

The Turkey Trots to Water

 

i'm basing much of my analysis and insight on a website with the above title. i find it the best for the topic i'm going to discuss. of all the naval battles in ww2, indeed in history, nothing quite approaches the size, scale and varied engagements of leyte gulf. most filipinos simply know it as the biggest naval battle in modern times. but one has to study the qualifications to appreciate it. in ancient times, the battle of salamis involved more ships. so did the battle of jutland in ww1 which was basically a gun-to-gun engagement between two high seas fleets, mainly capital ships in line formation. leyte gulf involved carriers and planes, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, even torpedo boats. and all types of vessels did their part. both sides launched planes from carriers and sank ships. battleships faught in classic line formation and close-in fighting. cruisers and destroyers did close-in attacks using both torpedos and gunfire, also sinking ships. torpedo boads did harassing torpedo runs at night. submariens managed to sink one surface warship.

 

i don't think the world will ever see such an integrated deployment of seapower again, just as unlikely that we'll ever see another bismark-hood duel.

 

step one in appreciating leyte gulf is to discuss weaponry. we're at the later half of the war. battleships in line were slowly being replaced by the carrier task force as the core of naval warfare. but battleships were still extremely active and in leyte gulf, critical. the real battleships came out in world war 1 through the independent efforts of the germans and british to develop a line ship that can defeat the enemy force in the high seas, and possibly deliver the war to the enemy's soil (at least within gun range.) the three-way formula was firepower-armor-speed. an inadequacy in any of the three will weaken the battleship. one has to draw a precise line in battleship development and that is in 1933 when the washington treaty was drawn up. pre-1933 battleships had main guns ranging from 12-in to 16 inches. main armor was at least 8 inches while turret/barbette armors exceeded 12 inches. maximum speed was 25 knots. most of the battleships in existence then saw action in ww1. it took more than 20 years to up battleship speed to 30+ knots, and that with heavier guns and thicker armor. if you want to know why it took so long to up speed by 5 knots, consider: engine horsepower and ship speed follows a cubic relation. post '33 saw the rise of modern battleships, or "fast battleships" as the british called them. guns were bigger and more powerful. armor was frighteningly thick. the 18.1 inch gun with a range of 25 miles was determined to be the most powerful one can mount on a battleship. later, the british and germans (and the japanese) determined that an even more monstrous 20-inch gun was possible. so take care to distinguish between a pre-33 battleship and a fast battleship. it's important.

 

next the aircraft carrier. modern fleet carriers (or fast attack carriers) can carry at least 90 planes, can run past 30 knots (outrunning most battleships.) for reasons of economy and expedience, navies had to build somewhat smaller and slower carriers. light carriers were fashioned from cruiser hulls. they can run past 30 knots but capacity was limited to around 60 planes. then there were the so-called escort carriers or "tin can carriers." these are mostly merchant/cargo ships hastilly converted to carrier role (it's easy, put an elevator and a flat topside.) these can carry up to 50 planes. speed was low, 20 to 25 knots. so these were the carriers at the time of leyte gulf. take care to distinguish which is which. it's also important.

 

[to be continued.]

[macbolan00]

The Turkey Trots to Water [continued]

 

the chain of command. i won't go into how it came to this, but general of the army doug macarthur was put in command of the drive into the philippines (which happened to be archipelagic.) having decided that a landing in eastern visayas was tactically the best spot, macarthur was given a navy to transport his army. so the US 7th fleet was organized. as rag-tag as one can make a fleet (even by non-US standards.) under the command of navy vice-admiral kinkaid, it consisted mostly of sea and amphibious tranports. it had a covering force consisting of 5 pre-33 battleships (mostly sunk at pearl harbor, refloated and modernized with gunnery radar.) it also had several escort carriers whose bombers were armed mostly with thin-walled anti-personnel bombs for land attack. then there were the supporting squadrons of cruisers, destroyers and submarines. this force was at least strong enough to thwart a weak to modest attack by a japanese surface naval force. but both macarthur and CINCPAC chief nimitz knew the strategic importance of the philippines and if the japanese came at them, it would be the entire (remaining) japanese navy hurling themselves at macarthur and kinkaid.

 

which is why, shadowing the 7th fleet at its back, to the east and slightly to the north, was the US navy 3rd fleet under the command of that navy's most able commander, bull halsey. now let's talk about the 3rd fleet. the 3rd fleet on its own was more powerful than any other navy in the world at the time. it had 10 fast attack carriers with a total of 1,200 strike planes. the pilots were the elite of the US navy, having taken on and destroyed most of japan's naval aviation in the marianas turkey shoot. it had 6 fast battleships (4 south dakota class and two iowa class battleships.) halsey's primary mission was to protect kinkaid's 7th but he knew this was his chance to destroy the remaining japanese ships in its navy. he wanted a decisive victory in the philippines to pave the way for an easy invasion of japan. and here halsey made his critical strategy for the battle: he will use his battleships to destroy the japanese capital ships. why battleships? the US knew there were as many as 7 japanese battleships out there ready to attack kinkaid. at least two of those are modern fast battleships. but halsey feared that use of 1,200 carrier planes could at best sink 3 or 4 enemy battleships but not all 7, especially if they were coming from different directions. his own battleships can split up and charge different targets at least. so halsey made a scientific decision to use battleships and analysts today feel he was right up to this point. what was the weakness in his plan? a battleship's guns has a maximum range of 25 miles. if the enemy showed itself, halsey will have to charge at it, momentarily leaving kinkaid's old battleships and slow carriers to fend for themselves.

 

[to be continued.]

[TheSmilingBandit]

I'd

say he is part megalomaniac and brilliant commander

Megalomaniac -- no, Patton was just too aggressive for the British to handle (i.e. during the Normandy invasion he wanted to quickly eliminate a German pocket but Montgomery was too cautious), but Eisenhower always had a leash on him.

Regards the slapping incident, I think he was part of the Old School of doing things...

He's just flashy for the cameras and for the Germans....

 

Brilliant commander -- yes, he's a tactical and logistical genius during the Bulge. :thumbsupsmiley:

DDE was a bit too busy boinking his Female Limey WAAC driver to bother supporting his fellow American generals against his beloved 'Monty'. However brilliant Patton may have been, he almost sacrificed his army when he drove it out of fuel. That's not a logistical genius.

 

@macbolan00: I'd love to see the rest of your post.

[macbolan00]

been awfully busy.

 

[continued]

the japanese strategy. in war, both powers know each other reasonably well. from resources, quality of arms and personnel, down to the commander's personality. well, this held very true at leyte gulf. the top japanese commander, kurita knew halsey very well. and he had a reasonably good idea how the american admiral would deploy his forces (a guess that was wholly correct.) so they knew halsey was out to destroy them completely. they knew halsey would probably plan on a decisive battleship action. so what to do? consider japanese resources at the time.

 

japanese naval air was almost completely sapped at the time. their four remaining fleet, light and hybrid carriers had less than 140 planes left. their aircraft were already obsolete, and their best (surviving) pilots have been pulled out to the homeland, having been deemed too valuable to lose. so carrier strength was hopeless to attack kinkaid's transports (the americans' weakest point) with any major result other than to probably lose all planes. even before attack planes could reach the 7th, the carriers and planes would likely be interdicted by planes from halsey's 3rd. but the japanese still had battleships, seven of them. of these, three were modern, the yamato, musashi and the nagato. four were ww1 vintage but two of them, kongo and haruna, were capable of 30 knots and skippered by excellent officers. if the japanese had a chance, it would be battleships.

 

so how to destroy kinkaid's 7th without the 3rd interfering? decoy halsey away. throughout the pacific war, the japanese had employed decoy forces with varying success. at midway, hosogoya's aleutian force did not draw fletcher and spruance. at coral sea, the light carrier hosho was sacrificed with the result that lexington was sunk and the yorktown hit. but battleships are easier to decoy away than carriers. this was kurita's biggest opportunity. a decoy force consisting of their remaining carriers (painted to look like battleships) under admiral ozawa would glide in from northern luzon down towards eastern visayas. halsey, if he takes the bait, will shoot northwards towards the force. if he goes north far enough, it would allow kurita's battleships to slip in from the west through san bernardino straight north of samar and surigao straight south of leyte and smash kinkaid.

 

the battle - palawan. as kurita's force was steaming eastwards towards the visayas, they were waylaid by american submarines. two japanese cruisers were hit. one would later sink. this early setback must have had an effect on kurita. fortunately, ozawa was already skirting northern luzon

 

easten luzon. ozawa sent his last 100 strike planes to attack the 7th. as expected, they were waylaid by halsey's fighters. hardly any strike plane returned. but one bomber dove at the escort carrier princeton, sinking it. they score one k*ll at the americans. but their real mission, to draw halsey northwards did not succeed. halsey thought the strike planes were land-based.

 

central visayas over at sibuyan. kurita's main battleship force was spotted by halsey's planes. the ships were attacked and the battleship musashi sunk. this must have further demoralized kurita, losing one of his two best battleships. of interest to analysts was the fact that it took more than 250 strike planes to sink musashi. from the numbers, one could already guess how the battle would have fared had halsey relied on his carrier planes exclusively. but kurita steamed on.

 

back to eastern luzon. ozawa is finally spotted. strike planes from the 3rd attack. halsey is informed that the vessels were battleships and he promptly swung northward and charged.

 

surigao straight - the southern japanese force consisting of two old battleships (yamashiro and fuso) try to slip through the straight under cover of darkness. they are spotted by torpedo boats that attempted to torpedo the japanese. they did not succeed but were able to radio the japanese location. later that night, US destroyers staged torpedo attacks. the yamashiro is hit and promptly breaks in two(!!) by morning, the fuso emerges from the straight into southern leyte --where kinkaid's 5 battleships were already lined up in broadside formation. each american battleship first atleast 75 main shells at the mutsu. the latter sank within an hour. end of the southern force.

 

samar. but look now. kurita emerges from the san bernardino and swings south right into two groups of escort carriers from the 7th. halsey's battleships were already too far north. kinkaid's own battleships were still at the leyte gulf area after having demolished the southern japanese force. four japanese battleships and three cruisers against only slow escort carriers and destroyers. but the american destroyers fought valiantly, preventing giant yamato from attacking the carriers. the other battleships sank destroyers. the kongo crippled carrier gambier bay, allowing the cruisers to sink her at close range. but the americans were scoring. attack planes from the other escort carriers sank the cruiser kumano and damaged another. at this stage, kurita withdrew.

 

cape engano, north luzon. halsey had destroyed ozyawa's 30 escort fighter planes. his flagship new jersey was now just 45 miles away from the japanese ships. in two more hours, the japanese would come within gun range. but now comes the radio message "turkey trots to water. where is task for 34? the world wonders." this message refered to TF 34 of the 3rd fleet consisting of the US's best battleships. the first and third sentences were random message pads to confuse the enemy. but on reading it, halsey learned the truth. he had been decoyed away, and the 7th escaped destruction through a mixture of luck, sheer bravery, and japanese indecision.

 

so on closing, halsey made a scientific decision. he wasn't over-matched. he took the risk of decoys as acceptable. the japanese move was brilliant, as brilliant as any maneuver they made during the war. but this time, luck was not on their side, the americans had too many bases covered, and kurita was just as anxious to preserve his ships as he was of winning. this two-way thought in the japanese commander's head brought about their defeat. their only consolation: they made halsey look foolish.

 

the article closed by concluding that both carriers and battleships performed as they were expected, that having lots of battleships and a creative commander could perform miracles. leyte gulf certainly did not spell the end of battleships as central fighting units. what did them in the long run was operating costs.

[TheSmilingBandit]

been awfully busy.

 

[continued]

the japanese strategy. in war, both powers know each other reasonably well. from resources, quality of arms and personnel, down to the commander's personality. well, this held very true at leyte gulf. the top japanese commander, kurita knew halsey very well. and he had a reasonably good idea how the american admiral would deploy his forces (a guess that was wholly correct.) so they knew halsey was out to destroy them completely. they knew halsey would probably plan on a decisive battleship action. so what to do? consider japanese resources at the time.

 

japanese naval air was almost completely sapped at the time. their four remaining fleet, light and hybrid carriers had less than 140 planes left. their aircraft were already obsolete, and their best (surviving) pilots have been pulled out to the homeland, having been deemed too valuable to lose. so carrier strength was hopeless to attack kinkaid's transports (the americans' weakest point) with any major result other than to probably lose all planes. even before attack planes could reach the 7th, the carriers and planes would likely be interdicted by planes from halsey's 3rd. but the japanese still had battleships, seven of them. of these, three were modern, the yamato, musashi and the nagato. four were ww1 vintage but two of them, kongo and haruna, were capable of 30 knots and skippered by excellent officers. if the japanese had a chance, it would be battleships.

 

so how to destroy kinkaid's 7th without the 3rd interfering? decoy halsey away. throughout the pacific war, the japanese had employed decoy forces with varying success. at midway, hosogoya's aleutian force did not draw fletcher and spruance. at coral sea, the light carrier hosho was sacrificed with the result that lexington was sunk and the yorktown hit. but battleships are easier to decoy away than carriers. this was kurita's biggest opportunity. a decoy force consisting of their remaining carriers (painted to look like battleships) under admiral ozawa would glide in from northern luzon down towards eastern visayas. halsey, if he takes the bait, will shoot northwards towards the force. if he goes north far enough, it would allow kurita's battleships to slip in from the west through san bernardino straight north of samar and surigao straight south of leyte and smash kinkaid.

 

the battle - palawan. as kurita's force was steaming eastwards towards the visayas, they were waylaid by american submarines. two japanese cruisers were hit. one would later sink. this early setback must have had an effect on kurita. fortunately, ozawa was already skirting northern luzon

 

easten luzon. ozawa sent his last 100 strike planes to attack the 7th. as expected, they were waylaid by halsey's fighters. hardly any strike plane returned. but one bomber dove at the escort carrier princeton, sinking it. they score one k*ll at the americans. but their real mission, to draw halsey northwards did not succeed. halsey thought the strike planes were land-based.

 

central visayas over at sibuyan. kurita's main battleship force was spotted by halsey's planes. the ships were attacked and the battleship musashi sunk. this must have further demoralized kurita, losing one of his two best battleships. of interest to analysts was the fact that it took more than 250 strike planes to sink musashi. from the numbers, one could already guess how the battle would have fared had halsey relied on his carrier planes exclusively. but kurita steamed on.

 

back to eastern luzon. ozawa is finally spotted. strike planes from the 3rd attack. halsey is informed that the vessels were battleships and he promptly swung northward and charged.

 

surigao straight - the southern japanese force consisting of two old battleships (yamashiro and fuso) try to slip through the straight under cover of darkness. they are spotted by torpedo boats that attempted to torpedo the japanese. they did not succeed but were able to radio the japanese location. later that night, US destroyers staged torpedo attacks. the yamashiro is hit and promptly breaks in two(!!) by morning, the fuso emerges from the straight into southern leyte --where kinkaid's 5 battleships were already lined up in broadside formation. each american battleship first atleast 75 main shells at the mutsu. the latter sank within an hour. end of the southern force.

 

samar. but look now. kurita emerges from the san bernardino and swings south right into two groups of escort carriers from the 7th. halsey's battleships were already too far north. kinkaid's own battleships were still at the leyte gulf area after having demolished the southern japanese force. four japanese battleships and three cruisers against only slow escort carriers and destroyers. but the american destroyers fought valiantly, preventing giant yamato from attacking the carriers. the other battleships sank destroyers. the kongo crippled carrier gambier bay, allowing the cruisers to sink her at close range. but the americans were scoring. attack planes from the other escort carriers sank the cruiser kumano and damaged another. at this stage, kurita withdrew.

 

cape engano, north luzon. halsey had destroyed ozyawa's 30 escort fighter planes. his flagship new jersey was now just 45 miles away from the japanese ships. in two more hours, the japanese would come within gun range. but now comes the radio message "turkey trots to water. where is task for 34? the world wonders." this message refered to TF 34 of the 3rd fleet consisting of the US's best battleships. the first and third sentences were random message pads to confuse the enemy. but on reading it, halsey learned the truth. he had been decoyed away, and the 7th escaped destruction through a mixture of luck, sheer bravery, and japanese indecision.

 

so on closing, halsey made a scientific decision. he wasn't over-matched. he took the risk of decoys as acceptable. the japanese move was brilliant, as brilliant as any maneuver they made during the war. but this time, luck was not on their side, the americans had too many bases covered, and kurita was just as anxious to preserve his ships as he was of winning. this two-way thought in the japanese commander's head brought about their defeat. their only consolation: they made halsey look foolish.

 

the article closed by concluding that both carriers and battleships performed as they were expected, that having lots of battleships and a creative commander could perform miracles. leyte gulf certainly did not spell the end of battleships as central fighting units. what did them in the long run was operating costs.

 

Pardon me, but shouldn't that be "Halsey is informed that the vessels were Carriers"

[fireman9927]

Why is it that the AFP can't seem to win their war against the CPP-NPA and the MNLF/MILF/ASG?

 

 

The AFP can win the war?Its POSSIBLE but they will not because the government will not aloow them...remember that war is bussiness (its both sides by the way)...

 

To win the battle against insurgency..eradicate poverty!!!!!

[macbolan00]

Pardon me, but shouldn't that be "Halsey is informed that the vessels were Carriers"

you're referring to the actual composition of ozawa's force? well that too, yes. but as to which particular instance that halsey realized he's been hoodwinked, i suspect it was the turkey message. it was the one he reacted to most. and even if he discovered that he was chasing carriers, not battleships, he would have continued pursuit if only to give the new jersey some bars on its gun barrels. as it happened, he gave up pursuit and realized his dual mission almost did him in, the way it did nagumo it at midway.

[TheSmilingBandit]

In a theoretical battle of ancient superpowers, who would you pick to win, the Chinese or the Romans? Why?

Depends which era and which commanders.