The Art of War

[TheSmilingBandit]

hmmm... spent time thinking of that. first, it doesn't make much sense to regret not having a historical figure at your side. any developed country has its fair share of "geniuses-in-waiting." in many cases, countries have too many talents elbowing each other at the top, often with negative results. the three russian top commanders during the final drive to berlin is one example. the western command with the likes of ike, monty, brad and george is probably the best example of what i'm saying. over at the pacific, all roosevelt had to do was toss a coin: will it be nimitz or macarthur who will lead the drive?

 

with regard to logistic support, we've seen how solid the commonwealth and even the allied coalition can be, so having a contiguous political influence over all territories isn't much of an advantage (think russia during world war 1.) what's important is you have the major industrial and population centers on your side. you'll be hard to beat in such as case.

 

lastly, the UK was as rich as a superpower can be going into world war 1. but see how the war bled it dry.

I was actually speaking of the latter quarter of the 1700s and the first half of the 1800s, pretty much pre-Industrial Revolution era. Many, if not most, of the European nations had aristocratic officer corps, most of whom were pretty lousy generals (see Lord Cardigan, Lord Raglan), come to think about it, lots of American generals were also pretty insipid.

[bekim]

You do realize that the Huks were the fighting arm of the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (a Marxist-Lenist group), an organization Taruc joined in 1935. The PKP is the forerunner of the CPP (which were Maoists) while the Huks were the forerunners of the NPA.

 

As for the Nenitas, they operated from mid 1946 to late 1949 as the local version of the death squads of South America. I think you are probably referring to the multiple Army units that operated in the 50s with a "hearts and minds" campaign as the disciplined units.

 

This is what it was as related to me by someone who was there during the period. A retired social studies and history professor in a college in Manila he was 17 years old and barely out of high school when he together with other young men and women joined the Huks in '42-45.... "The young men and women who joined the Huks in '42-45 were not communist, sila Luis Taruc & Jesus Lava lang and their familes ang mga Marxist-Lennist. Most of those who joined are even "little brown Americans" who joined the guerilla movement to harass the Japanese to pave the way for the return of Uncle Sam and not for the "praise and glory" of the communist movement. Towards the end of the war they became disgrunted when they realized that they were being "packaged" as communist guerillas. Afraid that the "red tag" will cause them their "guerilla recognition" and "backpay" they broke ranks and joined the other guerilla groups so that they can be listed in their roster of members. Those who were unable to do so did have problems with their "backpay claims" in 1946 and "revolted". That revolt was for their back pay and not for the communist ideology kaya nga ang daling natalo eh, but writers with certain agenda wrote history with "red" in mind", so that's what you young guys are now reading".

Edited January 12, 2010 by bekim

[TheSmilingBandit]

This is what it was as related to me by someone who was there during the period. A retired social studies and history professor in a college in Manila he was 17 years old and barely out of high school when he together with other young men and women joined the Huks in '42-45.... "The young men and women who joined the Huks in '42-45 were not communist, sila Luis Taruc & Jesus Lava lang and their familes ang mga Marxist-Lennist. Most of those who joined are even "little brown Americans" who joined the guerilla movement to harass the Japanese to pave the way for the return of Uncle Sam and not for the "praise and glory" of the communist movement. Towards the end of the war they became disgrunted when they realized that they were being "packaged" as communist guerillas. Afraid that the "red tag" will cause them their "guerilla recognition" and "backpay" they broke ranks and joined the other guerilla groups so that they can be listed in their roster of members. Those who were unable to do so did have problems with their "backpay claims" in 1946 and "revolted". That revolt was for their back pay and not for the communist ideology kaya nga ang daling natalo eh, but writers with certain agenda wrote history with "red" in mind", so that's what you young guys are now reading".

Tales were also told to me by my elders about this period, and while the rank and file may not have truly been communist at heart, their leaders were.

 

Thank you for calling me a young guy. :thumbsupsmiley:

[logandakma]

My dad told me of tales of "guerillang manok" who really were not guerillyeros but were able to collect backpays. I remember his story of a "dynamite fisherman" who lost his right hand when the dynamite he was about to throw to the sea exploded in his hand. After the war he got himself listed as a guerillyero and claimed he lost his hand in combat with the Japs. Nagi siyang pensionado until his death.

[TheSmilingBandit]

My dad told me of tales of "guerillang manok" who really were not guerillyeros but were able to collect backpays. I remember his story of a "dynamite fisherman" who lost his right hand when the dynamite he was about to throw to the sea exploded in his hand. After the war he got himself listed as a guerillyero and claimed he lost his hand in combat with the Japs. Nagi siyang pensionado until his death.

 

Well, what can I say, lots of people are genuine a$$holes.

 

Speaking of such, in the opinion of my fellow chairborne brigade members, do you guys believe that Patton was truly deranged or was he just acting?

[Sigmundo]

I'd say he is part megalomaniac and brilliant commander

[pilot13]

Megalomaniac -- no, Patton was just too aggressive for the British to handle (i.e. during the Normandy invasion he wanted to quickly eliminate a German pocket but Montgomery was too cautious), but Eisenhower always had a leash on him.

Regards the slapping incident, I think he was part of the Old School of doing things...

He's just flashy for the cameras and for the Germans....

 

Brilliant commander -- yes, he's a tactical and logistical genius during the Bulge. :thumbsupsmiley:

[macbolan00]

The Turkey Trots to Water

 

i'm basing much of my analysis and insight on a website with the above title. i find it the best for the topic i'm going to discuss. of all the naval battles in ww2, indeed in history, nothing quite approaches the size, scale and varied engagements of leyte gulf. most filipinos simply know it as the biggest naval battle in modern times. but one has to study the qualifications to appreciate it. in ancient times, the battle of salamis involved more ships. so did the battle of jutland in ww1 which was basically a gun-to-gun engagement between two high seas fleets, mainly capital ships in line formation. leyte gulf involved carriers and planes, battleships, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, even torpedo boats. and all types of vessels did their part. both sides launched planes from carriers and sank ships. battleships faught in classic line formation and close-in fighting. cruisers and destroyers did close-in attacks using both torpedos and gunfire, also sinking ships. torpedo boads did harassing torpedo runs at night. submariens managed to sink one surface warship.

 

i don't think the world will ever see such an integrated deployment of seapower again, just as unlikely that we'll ever see another bismark-hood duel.

 

step one in appreciating leyte gulf is to discuss weaponry. we're at the later half of the war. battleships in line were slowly being replaced by the carrier task force as the core of naval warfare. but battleships were still extremely active and in leyte gulf, critical. the real battleships came out in world war 1 through the independent efforts of the germans and british to develop a line ship that can defeat the enemy force in the high seas, and possibly deliver the war to the enemy's soil (at least within gun range.) the three-way formula was firepower-armor-speed. an inadequacy in any of the three will weaken the battleship. one has to draw a precise line in battleship development and that is in 1933 when the washington treaty was drawn up. pre-1933 battleships had main guns ranging from 12-in to 16 inches. main armor was at least 8 inches while turret/barbette armors exceeded 12 inches. maximum speed was 25 knots. most of the battleships in existence then saw action in ww1. it took more than 20 years to up battleship speed to 30+ knots, and that with heavier guns and thicker armor. if you want to know why it took so long to up speed by 5 knots, consider: engine horsepower and ship speed follows a cubic relation. post '33 saw the rise of modern battleships, or "fast battleships" as the british called them. guns were bigger and more powerful. armor was frighteningly thick. the 18.1 inch gun with a range of 25 miles was determined to be the most powerful one can mount on a battleship. later, the british and germans (and the japanese) determined that an even more monstrous 20-inch gun was possible. so take care to distinguish between a pre-33 battleship and a fast battleship. it's important.

 

next the aircraft carrier. modern fleet carriers (or fast attack carriers) can carry at least 90 planes, can run past 30 knots (outrunning most battleships.) for reasons of economy and expedience, navies had to build somewhat smaller and slower carriers. light carriers were fashioned from cruiser hulls. they can run past 30 knots but capacity was limited to around 60 planes. then there were the so-called escort carriers or "tin can carriers." these are mostly merchant/cargo ships hastilly converted to carrier role (it's easy, put an elevator and a flat topside.) these can carry up to 50 planes. speed was low, 20 to 25 knots. so these were the carriers at the time of leyte gulf. take care to distinguish which is which. it's also important.

 

[to be continued.]

[macbolan00]

The Turkey Trots to Water [continued]

 

the chain of command. i won't go into how it came to this, but general of the army doug macarthur was put in command of the drive into the philippines (which happened to be archipelagic.) having decided that a landing in eastern visayas was tactically the best spot, macarthur was given a navy to transport his army. so the US 7th fleet was organized. as rag-tag as one can make a fleet (even by non-US standards.) under the command of navy vice-admiral kinkaid, it consisted mostly of sea and amphibious tranports. it had a covering force consisting of 5 pre-33 battleships (mostly sunk at pearl harbor, refloated and modernized with gunnery radar.) it also had several escort carriers whose bombers were armed mostly with thin-walled anti-personnel bombs for land attack. then there were the supporting squadrons of cruisers, destroyers and submarines. this force was at least strong enough to thwart a weak to modest attack by a japanese surface naval force. but both macarthur and CINCPAC chief nimitz knew the strategic importance of the philippines and if the japanese came at them, it would be the entire (remaining) japanese navy hurling themselves at macarthur and kinkaid.

 

which is why, shadowing the 7th fleet at its back, to the east and slightly to the north, was the US navy 3rd fleet under the command of that navy's most able commander, bull halsey. now let's talk about the 3rd fleet. the 3rd fleet on its own was more powerful than any other navy in the world at the time. it had 10 fast attack carriers with a total of 1,200 strike planes. the pilots were the elite of the US navy, having taken on and destroyed most of japan's naval aviation in the marianas turkey shoot. it had 6 fast battleships (4 south dakota class and two iowa class battleships.) halsey's primary mission was to protect kinkaid's 7th but he knew this was his chance to destroy the remaining japanese ships in its navy. he wanted a decisive victory in the philippines to pave the way for an easy invasion of japan. and here halsey made his critical strategy for the battle: he will use his battleships to destroy the japanese capital ships. why battleships? the US knew there were as many as 7 japanese battleships out there ready to attack kinkaid. at least two of those are modern fast battleships. but halsey feared that use of 1,200 carrier planes could at best sink 3 or 4 enemy battleships but not all 7, especially if they were coming from different directions. his own battleships can split up and charge different targets at least. so halsey made a scientific decision to use battleships and analysts today feel he was right up to this point. what was the weakness in his plan? a battleship's guns has a maximum range of 25 miles. if the enemy showed itself, halsey will have to charge at it, momentarily leaving kinkaid's old battleships and slow carriers to fend for themselves.

 

[to be continued.]

[TheSmilingBandit]

I'd

say he is part megalomaniac and brilliant commander

Megalomaniac -- no, Patton was just too aggressive for the British to handle (i.e. during the Normandy invasion he wanted to quickly eliminate a German pocket but Montgomery was too cautious), but Eisenhower always had a leash on him.

Regards the slapping incident, I think he was part of the Old School of doing things...

He's just flashy for the cameras and for the Germans....

 

Brilliant commander -- yes, he's a tactical and logistical genius during the Bulge. :thumbsupsmiley:

DDE was a bit too busy boinking his Female Limey WAAC driver to bother supporting his fellow American generals against his beloved 'Monty'. However brilliant Patton may have been, he almost sacrificed his army when he drove it out of fuel. That's not a logistical genius.

 

@macbolan00: I'd love to see the rest of your post.

[macbolan00]

been awfully busy.

 

[continued]

the japanese strategy. in war, both powers know each other reasonably well. from resources, quality of arms and personnel, down to the commander's personality. well, this held very true at leyte gulf. the top japanese commander, kurita knew halsey very well. and he had a reasonably good idea how the american admiral would deploy his forces (a guess that was wholly correct.) so they knew halsey was out to destroy them completely. they knew halsey would probably plan on a decisive battleship action. so what to do? consider japanese resources at the time.

 

japanese naval air was almost completely sapped at the time. their four remaining fleet, light and hybrid carriers had less than 140 planes left. their aircraft were already obsolete, and their best (surviving) pilots have been pulled out to the homeland, having been deemed too valuable to lose. so carrier strength was hopeless to attack kinkaid's transports (the americans' weakest point) with any major result other than to probably lose all planes. even before attack planes could reach the 7th, the carriers and planes would likely be interdicted by planes from halsey's 3rd. but the japanese still had battleships, seven of them. of these, three were modern, the yamato, musashi and the nagato. four were ww1 vintage but two of them, kongo and haruna, were capable of 30 knots and skippered by excellent officers. if the japanese had a chance, it would be battleships.

 

so how to destroy kinkaid's 7th without the 3rd interfering? decoy halsey away. throughout the pacific war, the japanese had employed decoy forces with varying success. at midway, hosogoya's aleutian force did not draw fletcher and spruance. at coral sea, the light carrier hosho was sacrificed with the result that lexington was sunk and the yorktown hit. but battleships are easier to decoy away than carriers. this was kurita's biggest opportunity. a decoy force consisting of their remaining carriers (painted to look like battleships) under admiral ozawa would glide in from northern luzon down towards eastern visayas. halsey, if he takes the bait, will shoot northwards towards the force. if he goes north far enough, it would allow kurita's battleships to slip in from the west through san bernardino straight north of samar and surigao straight south of leyte and smash kinkaid.

 

the battle - palawan. as kurita's force was steaming eastwards towards the visayas, they were waylaid by american submarines. two japanese cruisers were hit. one would later sink. this early setback must have had an effect on kurita. fortunately, ozawa was already skirting northern luzon

 

easten luzon. ozawa sent his last 100 strike planes to attack the 7th. as expected, they were waylaid by halsey's fighters. hardly any strike plane returned. but one bomber dove at the escort carrier princeton, sinking it. they score one k*ll at the americans. but their real mission, to draw halsey northwards did not succeed. halsey thought the strike planes were land-based.

 

central visayas over at sibuyan. kurita's main battleship force was spotted by halsey's planes. the ships were attacked and the battleship musashi sunk. this must have further demoralized kurita, losing one of his two best battleships. of interest to analysts was the fact that it took more than 250 strike planes to sink musashi. from the numbers, one could already guess how the battle would have fared had halsey relied on his carrier planes exclusively. but kurita steamed on.

 

back to eastern luzon. ozawa is finally spotted. strike planes from the 3rd attack. halsey is informed that the vessels were battleships and he promptly swung northward and charged.

 

surigao straight - the southern japanese force consisting of two old battleships (yamashiro and fuso) try to slip through the straight under cover of darkness. they are spotted by torpedo boats that attempted to torpedo the japanese. they did not succeed but were able to radio the japanese location. later that night, US destroyers staged torpedo attacks. the yamashiro is hit and promptly breaks in two(!!) by morning, the fuso emerges from the straight into southern leyte --where kinkaid's 5 battleships were already lined up in broadside formation. each american battleship first atleast 75 main shells at the mutsu. the latter sank within an hour. end of the southern force.

 

samar. but look now. kurita emerges from the san bernardino and swings south right into two groups of escort carriers from the 7th. halsey's battleships were already too far north. kinkaid's own battleships were still at the leyte gulf area after having demolished the southern japanese force. four japanese battleships and three cruisers against only slow escort carriers and destroyers. but the american destroyers fought valiantly, preventing giant yamato from attacking the carriers. the other battleships sank destroyers. the kongo crippled carrier gambier bay, allowing the cruisers to sink her at close range. but the americans were scoring. attack planes from the other escort carriers sank the cruiser kumano and damaged another. at this stage, kurita withdrew.

 

cape engano, north luzon. halsey had destroyed ozyawa's 30 escort fighter planes. his flagship new jersey was now just 45 miles away from the japanese ships. in two more hours, the japanese would come within gun range. but now comes the radio message "turkey trots to water. where is task for 34? the world wonders." this message refered to TF 34 of the 3rd fleet consisting of the US's best battleships. the first and third sentences were random message pads to confuse the enemy. but on reading it, halsey learned the truth. he had been decoyed away, and the 7th escaped destruction through a mixture of luck, sheer bravery, and japanese indecision.

 

so on closing, halsey made a scientific decision. he wasn't over-matched. he took the risk of decoys as acceptable. the japanese move was brilliant, as brilliant as any maneuver they made during the war. but this time, luck was not on their side, the americans had too many bases covered, and kurita was just as anxious to preserve his ships as he was of winning. this two-way thought in the japanese commander's head brought about their defeat. their only consolation: they made halsey look foolish.

 

the article closed by concluding that both carriers and battleships performed as they were expected, that having lots of battleships and a creative commander could perform miracles. leyte gulf certainly did not spell the end of battleships as central fighting units. what did them in the long run was operating costs.

[TheSmilingBandit]

been awfully busy.

 

[continued]

the japanese strategy. in war, both powers know each other reasonably well. from resources, quality of arms and personnel, down to the commander's personality. well, this held very true at leyte gulf. the top japanese commander, kurita knew halsey very well. and he had a reasonably good idea how the american admiral would deploy his forces (a guess that was wholly correct.) so they knew halsey was out to destroy them completely. they knew halsey would probably plan on a decisive battleship action. so what to do? consider japanese resources at the time.

 

japanese naval air was almost completely sapped at the time. their four remaining fleet, light and hybrid carriers had less than 140 planes left. their aircraft were already obsolete, and their best (surviving) pilots have been pulled out to the homeland, having been deemed too valuable to lose. so carrier strength was hopeless to attack kinkaid's transports (the americans' weakest point) with any major result other than to probably lose all planes. even before attack planes could reach the 7th, the carriers and planes would likely be interdicted by planes from halsey's 3rd. but the japanese still had battleships, seven of them. of these, three were modern, the yamato, musashi and the nagato. four were ww1 vintage but two of them, kongo and haruna, were capable of 30 knots and skippered by excellent officers. if the japanese had a chance, it would be battleships.

 

so how to destroy kinkaid's 7th without the 3rd interfering? decoy halsey away. throughout the pacific war, the japanese had employed decoy forces with varying success. at midway, hosogoya's aleutian force did not draw fletcher and spruance. at coral sea, the light carrier hosho was sacrificed with the result that lexington was sunk and the yorktown hit. but battleships are easier to decoy away than carriers. this was kurita's biggest opportunity. a decoy force consisting of their remaining carriers (painted to look like battleships) under admiral ozawa would glide in from northern luzon down towards eastern visayas. halsey, if he takes the bait, will shoot northwards towards the force. if he goes north far enough, it would allow kurita's battleships to slip in from the west through san bernardino straight north of samar and surigao straight south of leyte and smash kinkaid.

 

the battle - palawan. as kurita's force was steaming eastwards towards the visayas, they were waylaid by american submarines. two japanese cruisers were hit. one would later sink. this early setback must have had an effect on kurita. fortunately, ozawa was already skirting northern luzon

 

easten luzon. ozawa sent his last 100 strike planes to attack the 7th. as expected, they were waylaid by halsey's fighters. hardly any strike plane returned. but one bomber dove at the escort carrier princeton, sinking it. they score one k*ll at the americans. but their real mission, to draw halsey northwards did not succeed. halsey thought the strike planes were land-based.

 

central visayas over at sibuyan. kurita's main battleship force was spotted by halsey's planes. the ships were attacked and the battleship musashi sunk. this must have further demoralized kurita, losing one of his two best battleships. of interest to analysts was the fact that it took more than 250 strike planes to sink musashi. from the numbers, one could already guess how the battle would have fared had halsey relied on his carrier planes exclusively. but kurita steamed on.

 

back to eastern luzon. ozawa is finally spotted. strike planes from the 3rd attack. halsey is informed that the vessels were battleships and he promptly swung northward and charged.

 

surigao straight - the southern japanese force consisting of two old battleships (yamashiro and fuso) try to slip through the straight under cover of darkness. they are spotted by torpedo boats that attempted to torpedo the japanese. they did not succeed but were able to radio the japanese location. later that night, US destroyers staged torpedo attacks. the yamashiro is hit and promptly breaks in two(!!) by morning, the fuso emerges from the straight into southern leyte --where kinkaid's 5 battleships were already lined up in broadside formation. each american battleship first atleast 75 main shells at the mutsu. the latter sank within an hour. end of the southern force.

 

samar. but look now. kurita emerges from the san bernardino and swings south right into two groups of escort carriers from the 7th. halsey's battleships were already too far north. kinkaid's own battleships were still at the leyte gulf area after having demolished the southern japanese force. four japanese battleships and three cruisers against only slow escort carriers and destroyers. but the american destroyers fought valiantly, preventing giant yamato from attacking the carriers. the other battleships sank destroyers. the kongo crippled carrier gambier bay, allowing the cruisers to sink her at close range. but the americans were scoring. attack planes from the other escort carriers sank the cruiser kumano and damaged another. at this stage, kurita withdrew.

 

cape engano, north luzon. halsey had destroyed ozyawa's 30 escort fighter planes. his flagship new jersey was now just 45 miles away from the japanese ships. in two more hours, the japanese would come within gun range. but now comes the radio message "turkey trots to water. where is task for 34? the world wonders." this message refered to TF 34 of the 3rd fleet consisting of the US's best battleships. the first and third sentences were random message pads to confuse the enemy. but on reading it, halsey learned the truth. he had been decoyed away, and the 7th escaped destruction through a mixture of luck, sheer bravery, and japanese indecision.

 

so on closing, halsey made a scientific decision. he wasn't over-matched. he took the risk of decoys as acceptable. the japanese move was brilliant, as brilliant as any maneuver they made during the war. but this time, luck was not on their side, the americans had too many bases covered, and kurita was just as anxious to preserve his ships as he was of winning. this two-way thought in the japanese commander's head brought about their defeat. their only consolation: they made halsey look foolish.

 

the article closed by concluding that both carriers and battleships performed as they were expected, that having lots of battleships and a creative commander could perform miracles. leyte gulf certainly did not spell the end of battleships as central fighting units. what did them in the long run was operating costs.

 

Pardon me, but shouldn't that be "Halsey is informed that the vessels were Carriers"

[fireman9927]

Why is it that the AFP can't seem to win their war against the CPP-NPA and the MNLF/MILF/ASG?

 

 

The AFP can win the war?Its POSSIBLE but they will not because the government will not aloow them...remember that war is bussiness (its both sides by the way)...

 

To win the battle against insurgency..eradicate poverty!!!!!

[macbolan00]

Pardon me, but shouldn't that be "Halsey is informed that the vessels were Carriers"

you're referring to the actual composition of ozawa's force? well that too, yes. but as to which particular instance that halsey realized he's been hoodwinked, i suspect it was the turkey message. it was the one he reacted to most. and even if he discovered that he was chasing carriers, not battleships, he would have continued pursuit if only to give the new jersey some bars on its gun barrels. as it happened, he gave up pursuit and realized his dual mission almost did him in, the way it did nagumo it at midway.

[TheSmilingBandit]

In a theoretical battle of ancient superpowers, who would you pick to win, the Chinese or the Romans? Why?

Depends which era and which commanders.