Military Literature

[Stephen A.]

looking for something para iregalo sa tatay ko e...mahilig yun sa mga military stories, being a former engine room chief in the navy himself...

[hellspawn]

Nothing like the Sun tzu, The Book of Five Rings & the Tao of Jeet Kune Do.

 

miyamoto musashi's "go rin no sho" or more correctly "a book of five rings" deals more with strategy, philosophy, and tactics for single combat. fully apparent to anybody who's actually read the book.

 

bruce lee's "the tao of jeet kune do" can in no way be described as a military book, which again would be apparent to anybody who's actually read it.

 

just to clarify, sun tzu is the author, "the art of war" is the book. "the sun tzu" is either a typographical error or the rather sad attempt by somebody to interject into a topic he knows nothing about.

[belisarius]

sobra ka naman. the "sun tzu" should be automatically taken to mean the book "the art of war".

 

i used to be into the martial arts and the miyamoto book never impressed me to be anything more than a manual on sword fighting.

 

the tao of jeet kun do is simply the advance manual. it's similar to mas oyama's series

 

what is karate?

this is karate

advanced karate

[hornykid66]

Try reading Black Hawk Down by Mark Bowden-which was later made into a movie.

[paeng]

Check out this review of the film version:

 

http://www.wsws.org/articles/2002/feb2002/hawk-f19.shtml

[suunto78]

"The Charioteer"

by Mary Renault

[suunto78]

i also like the story of Lawrence of Arabia...

[ken_2_10_nah]

T.E. Lawrence was into masochism and had a male Arab lover.

[koopahl]

something of an anachronism before but now it's the new military look...actually the private military look...

 

Corporate Soldiers and International Security: The Rise of Private Military by Christopher Kinsey. Abingdon: Routledge, 2006. 208 pp.

 

The explosive growth of the private security industry in recent years represents one of the most striking changes in the way states organise for and conduct wars. Private security companies and private military companies are a feature of modern war that captures the public imagination, conjuring up images of soldiers of fortune and questions about the extent to which states can and should privatise conflict.

 

As a group, private contractors were the second largest component of the American-led 'coalition of the willing' during the 2003 Iraq War, and the level of military services provided by the private sector in both Iraq and Afghanistan has not been seen since states monopolised force in the nineteenth century.

 

The transfer of military services from the state to the private sector has been so rapid that it is perhaps not surprising that this area remains understudied. If we accept the Weberian definition of the state as the legitimate holder of the monopoly on the use of force, the decision to hand over aspects of that monopoly to the private sector requires thorough analysis.

 

Deborah Avant's approach in The Market for Force is firmly grounded in theoretical questions, and makes a theoretical as well as a practical contribution to our understanding of the field. Her use of theory is especially effective, illuminating rather than obscuring key issues. Conversely, Christopher Kinsey's Corporate Soldiers and International Security is rooted more in the world of policy, and he provides an excellent picture of the industry. Kinsey is especially effective at revealing the unique evolution of the British private security industry and the problems it has encountered.

 

Kinsey attempts to 'unravel some of the secrecy that surrounds the [private military] industry, while at the same time trying to explain the nature of this phenomenon' (p. 1). He does so in two main stages, first laying the groundwork necessary for understanding today's industry, and then examining it. Kinsey provides three main types of background material: a typology of the industry as a whole, a brief history of private force and a discussion of the evolution of the industry during the Cold War, focusing on British developments in the 1960s and 1970s. He then turns to examining contemporary issues of private security, supplying an especially detailed account of the 'Arms to Africa' affair involving the now-defunct private security company Sandline and detailing the emergence and growth of the industry in the United States and in Britain. He also discusses the role private security companies play in the developing world, looking at how the privatisation of security plays out in situations of warlord politics and in 'new wars'. Kinsey asserts that the descent into warlord politics has destabilised Africa at the same time warlords can use private military companies to secure their power. As warlord politics and shadow economies increase conflict in Africa, Kinsey argues that strategic complexes, or groups that link governments, international non-governmental organisations and private companies will emerge 'to resolve political impasses, undertake development, and improve on the lack of security that characterises most new wars' (p. 112), given a lack of Western interest or because of Western promotion of alternative methods of conflict resolution (p. 131). Strategic complexes are increasingly major players in the world of peacebuilding, and private military companies themselves are beginning to tackle peacebuilding and development work. Kinsey concludes with a discussion of why the industry needs to be regulated and how such regulation might work.

 

Avant's goal is to examine the extent to which privatisation will affect the state's traditional control over the use of force. She immediately unpacks this goal into more subtle categories, recognising that privatisation will differ in weak and in strong states and that 'control' of force is more complex than most critics realise. Avant also points out that privatisation of force can take two forms: the decision by a state to hire the private sector to carry out military or security tasks, like the use of a private security company to provide land-mine clearance in Iraq, and the purchase of security from a private security company by another private entity. Avant argues that control over force is actually best understood as comprising three different types: functional control (or the effectiveness of the military); political control (or which actors, organisations or individuals control force) and social control (the degree to which the use of force is congruent with broader social values, including democracy, international law, human rights and the protection of civilians in warfare). To assess whether or not privatisation has changed a state's control over force, Avant seeks to discover whether or not change has occurred in a functional sense (is the use of force more or less effective?); in a political sense (has there been a shift in the relative power of actors who control force?) and in a social sense (has there been a change in the way security reflects societal values?). In addition, Avant looks at how all three facets of control 'fit together', as this holds 'the key to stable, legitimate, and effective civil-military relations - the situation we recognise as effective control' (p. 45). Accordingly, Avant aims to discover whether or not privatisation enhances or detracts from the integration of these three elements, as an 'indicator of the longer term prospect for either the stability often associated with effective control or the instability and change associated with its absence' (p. 45).

 

To analyse the changes in control that privatisation might cause, Avant uses a sophisticated theoretical framework that melds economic and sociological institutionalism. Economic institutionalists are primarily interested in the effects of privatisation of functional and political control; they expect 'the private delivery of sovereign services' like force to 'erode functional control and change political control' (p. 49). They believe that the state will struggle to regulate the export of sovereign services and that the private financing of sovereign services will undermine state control by removing the state from the equation. Sociological institutionalists are interested in social and functional control, and expect that privatisation will either have minimal or positive effects on these types of control. The use of private security companies might enhance social and functional control by instilling in their clients the social values associated with military professionalism, which in strong states includes the values of liberalism and individual rights, and the values of democracy, including the notion of civilian control and rule of law.

 

Avant sensibly points out that joining these two different types of analysis together allows us to examine the interplay between all three types of control: when political, social and functional control are all successful it is possible to say that the state's control over force is effective. She also recognises that these types of control will vary between weak and strong states. The book then traces how privatisation of force has affected control in nine cases: three where the state has contracted with the private sector for military advice and training (the United States, Croatia and Sierra Leone); three where state control over force might be affected by the export of security services from state territory (the regulatory process in the United States, the UK and South Africa); and three where private entities hiring private security might influence the control of force (oil companies in Nigeria, relief organisations in refugee camps, and conservation organisations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo).

 

Both authors examine aspects of the privatisation of force that have never or only superficially been addressed, such as Avant's examination of the use of private security companies by international non-governmental organisations, particularly conservation groups. Because Avant has thoroughly examined the notion of control over violence, she is able to probe exactly where control is enhanced and where it is diminished by privatisation. Her discussion of how privatisation shifts the control of force from the legislative branch to the executive branch (in the American case, privileging the president over Congress) is a useful reminder of the way privatisation might erode democratic control over the use of force.

 

Kinsey's examination of the evolution of the British private security industry through the 1960s and 1970s provides a useful corrective to the notion that today's private military companies appeared out of nowhere in the 1990s. He points out that there has been a long, if informal and even covert, relationship between the UK government and private companies providing security. Kinsey also provides a strong account of the 'Arms to Africa' affair, in which the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was accused of colluding with the private security company Sandline to send arms to Sierra Leone, violating a United Nations arms embargo. While many accounts of the role of private military companies in Sierra Leone exist, very few look at the political effects of the affair in UK politics; Kinsey's is certainly the finest account of the affair and why it mattered so much.

 

Both authors also delve into the enormously complex and confused discussion over how to characterise the private security industry, a debate that heats up dramatically when the word 'mercenary' enters the equation. A wide variety of companies exist, and each is willing to undertake a range of different services; in the meantime, old-fashioned mercenaries still ply their trade in Africa, as the 2003 coup attempt in Equatorial Guinea demonstrates. Distinguishing between who sells what type of private force under which circumstances is not just an academic exercise; regulation of the private military industry will depend on deciding what kind of company provides legitimate and acceptable services.

 

Avant's approach to the problem is characteristically subtle. She points out that distinguishing companies on the basis of the services they provide is difficult, given that companies have the capacity to provide a wide variety of services, changing the category in which they are included. For example, a company might simultaneously provide training services and combat support services. Should that company then be categorised as a training company or a combat support company? Avant argues that it is best to examine what companies do in specific contracts, rather than trying to come up with an overarching framework explaining what they do all the time. Recognising that the term 'mercenary' has become extremely loaded, she avoids it altogether.

 

Kinsey notes the same problem of categorisation. He uses an elaborate typology that attempts to organise private military companies in four quadrants on the basis of whether or not they employ lethal force and whether the object they attempt to secure is private (an installation, for example) or public (which he defines as state authority). Placing companies within his four quadrants demonstrates that companies exist on two continua: one which ranges from low to high lethality, and one which ranges from purely private to purely public. Plotting a company or organisation on these two continua allows us to compare different providers of force; moreover, Kinsey recognises the wide variation in the willingness of companies to use lethal force. The difficulty with Kinsey's approach is that it does not entirely escape the trap he correctly identifies: how to deal with companies that do different things, often simultaneously, and certainly consecutively. The points plotted within Kinsey's four quadrants could be in several places at the same time as some companies might provide non-lethal forces for both private and public clients. For example, he places the British-based private military company ArmorGroup in a quadrant suggesting it avoids the use of lethal force, and works mainly in the private sector; however, ArmorGroup also works in the public sector, providing installation security for British embassies worldwide, suggesting it should also be plotted elsewhere. While Kinsey's approach is perhaps more thorough, Avant provides the neater solution to the difficulty of how to characterise the private military industry.

 

Avant's theoretical contribution is currently unparalleled in the literature on private force, and is likely to remain so for some time. Her approach is rigorous and meticulously argued. That said, there are two slight problems associated with her depiction of the control over force and in particular with social control.

 

First, with regard to Avant's depiction of the control of force, her discussion of the three modes of controlling force is extremely convincing. She notices that most discussion of the industry, whether by 'optimists' or 'pessimists' , is really about different types of control. Pessimists are worried about the negative effects of privatisation on political control, while optimists consider the potential positive benefits for functional control. This assertion is in itself novel, and combined with the complex account of control outlined above, demonstrates Avant's inventive contribution.

 

However, Avant leaves out legitimacy in her account of state control over force. It is intriguing that she relies on the Weberian definition of the state on the book's first page, but does not really delve into the importance of legitimacy for all three variants of force. When force isprivatised, whether or not control is legitimate will surely have a noticeable effect on the consequences. Avant discusses the differences that privatisation will make between 'weak' and 'strong' states, but does not really discuss how one of the key differences between the two has to do with legitimacy. Strong states are perceived to hold a legitimate monopoly on the use of force; one of the sources of legitimacy is democracy. Thus, when a strong state privatises force, it may have effects on political control in terms of the balance between the institutions and individuals that control force; but it might also have an effect on the legitimacy of political control. If exporting security services in the American context 'evades processes that give Congress checks on executive power' and reduces 'the amount of information the electorate is likely to have about foreign policy and the overall transparency of foreign policy' (p. 154), then democratic control over force might be diminished, and the state's legitimacy might be damaged.

 

The legitimacy problem also relates to some of the difficulties in Avant's conception of the social control of force. Avant believes that private security companies can transmit social values to their clients through military professionalism, and argues in the case of Croatia that military professionalism played a role in improving civil-military relations. She recognises, however, that military professionalism might not be the best mechanism on which to rely and, in her concluding chapters, provides an intriguing account of the relationship between privatisation and military professionalism. Privatisation might ultimately undermine military professionalism and dilute the values inherent in it (p. 225). A government, moreover, might not hire companies that embody military professionalism (p. 226-7).

 

However, there may be additional short-term problems with relying on military professionalism to enhance social control of force. It might be impossible to enhance social control of force in a state where the political control over force is marginally legitimate, as with the Strasser government's decision to hire the private military company Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone in the 1990s. Valentine Strasser, a young military officer, took power in a coup, and his legitimacy was dubious, although certainly better than some of the other alternatives (particularly the Revolutionary United Front). As Avant recognises, the Sierra Leone army was appalling, often fighting alongside the rebels it was supposedly trying to defeat, and Executive Outcome's contract never really included efforts to teach military professionalism. However, even if it had done so, would it have worked? It might be impossible for military professionalism, with its respect for the rule of law, democracy and individual rights, to take root in a country where none of these things exist and the state itself lacks legitimate political control over the use of force. Moreover, even if it did work, as Avant notes, all three mechanisms of control are related. If the military's professionalism improves, how will this then affect the other two mechanisms of control? A discussion of legitimacy might have added another dimension to an already excellent study; however, it is possible that doing so would have added another layer of complexity and perhaps confusion to a book that has an intricate, but elegantly worked out, theoretical structure.

 

Corporate Soldiers and International Security, because of its more descriptive orientation, runs into different problems. Kinsey's characterisation of international law is slightly troubling. He argues that anti-mercenary law is problematic, and while this is certainly true, it is perhaps not for the reasons Kinsey suggests. He argues that Article 47 of Protocol I, one of the main instruments of international law designed to deal with mercenaries, is flawed because of its cumulative definition. He asserts that all of the criteria must be met 'for a prosecution to go ahead' and that an individual would have to be unlucky 'to be convicted as a mercenary' (p. 19) under the definition. However, Article 47 is not criminal; it is not possible to either prosecute or convict using it. Rather, it simply removes combatant protection from mercenaries. It might bethat the absence of international criminal law dealing with either mercenaries or the private security industry represents a regulatory gap, but this is not the argument Kinsey makes.

 

The transfer of military services from the state to the private sector has been so rapid that it is perhaps not surprising that this area remains understudied. It is unlikely that military privatisation will ever disappear. The phenomenon of security privatisation poses so many questions that Avant and Kinsey certainly complement and rarely repeat each other; together they offer dispassionate guidance as to whether or not we should continue at the same rate of privatisation or cut back, and about the consequences of devolving core state functions to the private sector.

[paeng]

Do you mean his Seven Pillars of Wisdom? I found a used, hardcover copy in one local store.

 

i also like the story of Lawrence of Arabia...

[paeng]

I saw that book but chose not to buy it because there are too many works that I want to read (only a small portion consists of military literature). For example, there's even about about the Suez Crisis.

 

I feel that if one wants a general education about these matters, then he is better off not focusing on very specific topics and look for those books that cut across different historical periods and times. Examples include Keegan's book about war, David Stevenson's work about WWI, Niall Ferguson's War of the World, perhaps Cassell's World History of Warfare, and so on. That way, he can find time to read other books other than military literature.

 

just found out that antony beevor's "the battle for spain: the spanish civil war" has been re-issued. it's out in hardback, might have to wait for the paperback edition to come out as the hb is quite a big chunky book, not the sort of thing that packs up and transports easily.

 

the spanish civil war is of immense interest to me as we had relatives (although i've never met any of my iberian kin) fighting on both sides of the conflict. that's the saddest part of civil wars...

[Goddessa]

HI GUYS. LET'S MAKE A LIST OF THE MOST INFLUENTIAL MILITARY LEADERS OF ALL TIME:

 

I'LL START THE LIST, OK?

 

1. Alexander The Great (356-323 BC)... hmmm, he was described by historians as a beautiful boy, golden handsome and very gay...errr...he ruled for 15 years more or less as the mighty King of Macedonia and managed to form the largest empire in the history of the known world. Having a lover/s on the side (men, women, eunuchs alike) didn't stop him from becoming the greatest military commander the world has never seen. He integrated infantry, cavalry, and engineers with logistic and intelligence support in a manner never before experienced. His organizational skills, strategic and tactical innovations and personal bravery inspired many a military leaders that followed.

 

2. Julius Ceasar (100-44 BC)...a great fan of Alexander and like the Macedonian King, JC didn't live long enough to enjoy his empire but he bequeathed to his heir Augustus, (another great leader in history) and his Roman people more than five hundred years of global supremacy. The Roman empire had both ruled the west and east for so long and the Roman culture and system of administration continues to influence to this day. In fact, the Roman empire is still very much alive today, and is still so powerful, but it no longer carries a sword, but a cross. Hmmm, weren't the Romans the same folks who lynched Jesus Christ? I'm sure the Knights Templar are rolling in their graves now hehe. Calling the Illuminatis! I bet The all-seeing eye is watching...

 

3.Genghis Khan(1167-1227)...the name is synonimous to world domination and military might and easily ranks as one of the greatest military leaders of all time and he left a lasting legacy to his people, the Mongolian country that still exists today. Although vicious in war and refered to as a "barbarian" with his savage "horde" of an army, GK fostered peace and prosperity among his conquered territories. His empire lasted 150 years. He is very revered in Mongolia. His b-day is a holiday! I like this guy.

 

4. Tamerlane(1336-1405)... You might wonder how a lame person managed to become the most feared man in the middle ages? Tamerlane had suffered paralysis on his left arm and leg but his handicap didn't stop his ambition. The most ruthless conqueror of his time, he revived the empire of Genghis Khan but he lacked the true motivation to build a real empire. There is no doubt as to the vastness of his conquerred territories but he left nothing but vanquished people, scorched earth and mounds of glistening skulls. He looted his conquests and brought all spoils to his kingdom in Samarkand. Yup, he was a bloody rich SOB and he didn't wanna share. He was written down in history as a thieving, murdering barbarian.

 

5.Napoleon (1769-1821)...only narcissism had prevented this pompous ass from becoming god of all of Europe. A master of self-promotion, this self-styled emperor introduced the Napoleonic Code which did much to standardize laws and administration in Europe. He left no written philosophy of warfare but his military genius left no doubt as to his influence as a military tactician. This little man (5 ft 2 in) was a huge figure in the battlefield and how he loved to pick fights! It's true what they say about short men, hehe. Too bad Talleyrand fried him in his own sizzling pan.

[belisarius]

according to a survey of the faculty of west point (or was it sandhurst? tagal na kasi), the general with the most #1 votes was belisarius (hehe). consider his record:

 

1. he wasn't born to power. he rose from the ranks: a general at 25

2. never lost a battle up to the time he stopped in his 60s.

3. in battle he was always outnumbered.

4. his victories made his emperor (justinian) the most powerful roman/byzantine emperor in history. he won back rome from the barbarians, deafeted the persians, took north africa, controlled central and western europe.

[RPinay]

I loved For Whom the Bell Tolls by Hemingway and Battle Cry by Lean Uris

 

 

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/4/48/ErnestHemmingway_ForWhomTheBellTolls.jpghttp://www.fantasticfiction.co.uk/images/n13/n68707.jpg

[spongebobby]

i love john keegan's books, especially "the price of admiralty." in that book, he gave probably the most exhaustive analysis and description of the battle of trafalgar.