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b_9904

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Posts posted by b_9904

  1. ^mga ganun na nga ang presyo. Saan mo nakita sa websites?

     

    Sigh...

     

    madami naman po kasing website pwede bilhan kaso iba pa din kasi yung nakikita mo ang iyong binibili para matancha kung tutugma ba sa mga pangangailangan mo and bibilhin mo.

     

    ok din naman bumili sa mga websites kaso sa mga pinadalhan ko ng inquiry wala man lang sa kanila ang nag reply! amaderpak naman o!

  2. I am again in need of your sources with regards to the following:

     

    Provide the rule in the manner of legal citation of the following, provide at least one example for each instance,

     

    a. Essays or articles

     

    b. Books and phamplets (all types and levels of books and phamplets that can be used)

     

    c. Periodicals, articles, newspapers, speeches, letters, annotation, and interviews

     

    d. Encyclopedias, looseleaf services, book reviews

     

    e. Repeating citations (ito ba yung ibid or supra?)

     

    Thanks

     

    Go to the Supreme Court Web Site and look for the manual on judicial writing.

    manual_for_judicial_writing_body.pdf

  3. im not quite sure but under the new developments of the law, the consent of the father to use his surname by the illegitimate child is not necessary as long as the child is recognized and filiation is established in the birth certificate. Just my opinion.

     

    Ty po : )

  4. Kausapin yung ama na mag-execute ng affidavit to allow his child to use his surname, otherwise wala ka nang remedy, kasi nga ang general rule ay - illegitimate child uses the surname of the mother. Or, kung hindi pa rehistrado yung bata, irehistro sunod sa pangalan ng ama. Pag lumabas na yung birth certificate yun na ang kailangang sundin.

     

    Thank you po sobra!

     

    : )

  5. see full text of the decision below. but please check again if you got the correct citation. thanks.

    925 S.W.2d 232

     

    Court of Appeals of Tennessee,

    Middle Section, at Nashville.

    Albert Lee CRAIN, Plaintiff/Appellee,

    v.

    Velma Christine CRAIN, Defendant/Appellant.

     

    Feb. 14, 1996.

    Permission to Appeal Denied by the

    Supreme Court July 8, 1996.

     

    Husband filed for divorce, and wife counterclaimed for divorce and requested alimony pendente lite. The Chancery Court, Maury County, Jim T. Hamilton, J., declared parties divorced and determined that wife would not be paid further spousal support. Wife appealed. The Court of Appeals, Koch, J., held that record contained no grounds for concluding that trial court misapplied factors influencing decision of whether wife should receive rehabilitative alimony.

    Affirmed and remanded.

     

    *232 Thomas L. Whiteside, Fowlkes & Whiteside, Nashville, for appellant.

    Barbara J. Walker, Columbia, for appellee.

    OPINION

    KOCH, Judge.

    This appeal involves the dissolution of a 27-month marriage. After declaring the parties divorced pursuant to Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-4-129(B) (1991), the Chancery Court for Maury County awarded the parties the property held in their separate names and declined to award the wife rehabilitative spousal support. The wife now takes issue with the trial court's denial of her request for rehabilitative spousal support. We have determined that the wife is not entitled to spousal support under the facts of this case and, therefore, affirm the judgment.

    *233 I.

     

    Velma Christine Crain and Albert Lee Crain were first married in 1949. They divorced in 1973, and Mr. Crain remarried shortly thereafter. Mr. Crain was a radio engineer in the business of owning and constructing radio stations. He was quite successful with his business after his divorce in 1973. Mr. Crain began visiting the first Ms. Crain every weekend after separating from his second wife in April 1991. Mr. Crain eventually divorced his second wife in April 1992.

    The Crains married for the second time in July 1992. Mr. Crain moved from Mississippi to Columbia where Ms. Crain owned a home. Ms. Crain had been working for the Veterans Administration Hospital in Nashville for approximately five years. She managed the eye clinic and earned approximately $16,000 per year. Shortly after the marriage, Ms. Crain retired from the Veterans Administration because she expected to become a homemaker and to travel with Mr. Crain on his business trips.

    After the marriage, Mr. Crain bought Ms. Crain a new $18,000 automobile and helped her refinance her home mortgage to reduce the interest rate from 11% to 7.5% and to shorten the term of the loan from fifteen to ten years. He provided Ms. Crain with $1,500 per month for her personal and household needs, including her mortgage payments. Mr. Crain also opened a joint checking account, and both parties liberally withdrew funds from this account for personal and marital expenses.FN1 Ms. Crain, for example, used funds from the account to pay for eye-lid surgery that had been performed before the marriage.

     

    FN1. The parties disagreed concerning the amount of their withdrawals from this account. Mr. Crain insisted that Ms. Crain withdrew $48,000 for her personal use; while Ms. Crain accused Mr. Crain of placing $35,000 in a separate account. The trial court did not attempt to resolve these disputes, and we need not do so here.

    The Crains' marriage was short-lived. Mr. Crain moved out of the house after only twenty months and filed for divorce in March 1994. Ms. Crain counterclaimed for divorce and requested alimony pendente lite. The trial court directed Mr. Crain to pay Ms. Crain $2,000 per month until the date of the hearing on their divorce. Shortly after a hearing in October 1994, the trial court entered an order declaring the parties to be divorced without regard to fault and directing that the parties should retain the property presently held in their own names. The trial court also terminated Ms. Crain's alimony pendente lite and determined that Mr. Crain would not be required to pay Ms. Crain further spousal support of any sort. Ms. Crain has appealed from this decision.

    II.

     

    Ms. Crain insists that the trial court misapplied the statutory factors when it denied her request for rehabilitative spousal support. She asserts that the trial court did not give appropriate weight to her age, her limited employment prospects, Mr. Crain's superior earning capacity, and her contributions as a homemaker during the marriage. Mr. Crain responds that Ms. Crain's post-divorce finances are better than her pre-divorce finances, that she obtained many new assets during the marriage, and that Ms. Crain is able to work but has not seriously pursued a job.

    [1] [2] [3] There are no hard and fast rules for determining whether a spouse should be required to support a former spouse. Cranford v. Cranford, 772 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Tenn.Ct.App.1989). These decisions are heavily fact-dependent and require the careful balancing of many factors, including those identified in Tenn.Code Ann. § 35-5-101(d)(1) (Supp.1995). Hawkins v. Hawkins, 883 S.W.2d 622, 625 (Tenn.Ct.App.1994); Loyd v. Loyd, 860 S.W.2d 409, 412 (Tenn.Ct.App.1993). Appellate courts give wide latitude to trial courts' spousal support and maintenance decisions. Jones v. Jones, 784 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tenn.Ct.App.1989). These decisions are, however, subject to appellate review. We will scrutinize them to determine whether they reflect a proper application of the relevant legal principles and whether they are supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Cranford v. Cranford, 772 S.W.2d at 50.

    *234 [4] [5] The most common factors influencing spousal support decisions are the need of the spouse requesting support, the fault of the obligor spouse, and the ability of the obligor spouse to provide support. Hawkins v. Hawkins, 883 S.W.2d at 625; Bull v. Bull, 729 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tenn.Ct.App.1987). In the case of marriages of short duration, the justification for spousal support is diminished when the spouse seeking support has contributed little, directly or indirectly, to the marriage. Flanagan v. Flanagan, 656 S.W.2d 1, 3-4 (Tenn.Ct.App.1983) (spousal support limited to $750 when the parties' second marriage lasted only thirteen months); Spencer v. Spencer, App. No. 01-A-01-9109-CV-00328, slip op. at 7-8, 17 T.A.M. 43-16, 7 T.F.L.L. 1-16, 1992 WL 247641 (Tenn.Ct.App. Oct. 2, 1992) (no spousal support needed following the dissolution of a short-term marriage).

    [6] This record contains no grounds for concluding that the trial court misapplied the factors influencing whether Ms. Crain should receive rehabilitative alimony. As a result of the marriage, she has received an $18,000 automobile, funds to pay a pre-existing medical bill, and assistance in obtaining a more favorable mortgage on her home. She has also made liberal use of the funds Mr. Crain placed in their joint account as well as $8,000 in alimony pendente lite. The value of these items offsets the value of her contributions to the marriage.

    Ms. Crain retired from the Veterans Administration because she anticipated that Mr. Crain would support her for the rest of her life. Mr. Crain did not object to her early retirement but did not demand it either. While her marriage to Mr. Crain played a significant role in her decision to stop working at the age of sixty-three, it would be unfair to find that Mr. Crain was solely responsible for this decision. Ms. Crain must also accept part of this responsibility.

    Even though Ms. Crain was sixty-five years old at the time of the hearing, her age and physical condition do not disqualify her from seeking employment. She has held several types of jobs during her career. She requested rehabilitative support but never described what additional training or education she intended to pursue or how this training would enhance her employability. The most significant barrier to her re-employment appears to be her lack of motivation to look for work. Since the separation, she has done little more than “accumulating information concerning return to federal employment.” She has not pursued private sector jobs because she favors the government's benefits and because she would “rather not work at McDonald's.” Balancing all the equities in this case, Mr. Crain should not be required to pay Ms. Crain rehabilitative spousal support simply because she decided to retire from the Veterans Administration when she married Mr. Crain.

    III.

     

    We affirm the judgment and remand the case to the trial court for whatever other proceedings may be required. We also tax the costs of this appeal to Velma Christine Crain and her surety for which execution, if necessary, may issue.

     

    TODD, P.J., (M.S.) and CANTRELL, J., concur.

     

    yup, tama yung citation crain vs. crain, 37 alr 4th 15.

     

    kaso yung post mo is not about the hla test.

     

    o well.

     

    ty pa din sobra tol

  6. Guys,

     

    teka may tanong lang ako regarding Republic Act No. 9255.

     

    does it mean na yung mga batang pwedeng mag change ng name eh yung mga recognized by the father?

     

    papaano kung after ng isang civil suit eh napatunayang anak ng tatay yung bata, mag aaply pa din ba yung Republic Act No. 9255?

     

    if mag-aaply man, do you know any cases ng supreme court na ganito ang situation?

     

    may friend kasi ako na ganito ang situation eh.

  7. Guys,

     

    ask ko lang...

     

    saan ko makikita ito?

     

    1. Crain v. Crain, 37 ALR 4th 15

     

    it's about the HLA testing kaso hindi ko alam kung anong ibig sabihin ng "37 ALR 4th 15"

     

    thank you po in advance

  8. Repost po ito galing: http://manilatonight.com/index.php?showtop...410&st=1680

     

    "hi, i'm not a lawyer, i'm not a law student. but i need to ask people here for advice. hope people could help. thanks in advance.

     

    here is the situation

     

    1. there is a person who claimed he created a software/application for our company, this was however, done verbally. no written records.

    2. the owner and all employees were made to believe that he developed these applications.

    3. the said person was fired because of some other reason not related to the software/applications.

    4. since these applications were supposedly his creations, the company was paying him, aside from his salary, the rights to use his creations.

    5. since he was fired, the company was forced to create their own applications. and during research, it was discovered that said creations weren't really his. it was bought from another company.

    6. the seller company confirmed it was bought by the said person.

    7. now company wants to sue him for claiming he created the applications and making the company pay for the use of creations.

    8. the creations were bought at around 20% what he charges the company every month. in total roughly around $48,000 were paid to him. for a software the company could have bought for $300.

     

     

    that's the situation.

    the questions are

    1. can we sue him for claiming he created the applications/software eventhough we don't have a written document stating he created it.

    2. can we sue him and get refund for the charges we paid him?

    3. The only document we have is a memo introducing him to a new employee as the creator of the applications. he didn't author the memo. but he welcomed the new employee, and he neither confirmed nor denied that he created the application. Thus wouldn't that imply that he indeed let the company believe that he created the applications? Will that be considered evidence?

     

    Thanks. hehehehe.. sorry seryoso ako masyado. i'm mad kasi eh. he attacked me professionally and personally kasi eh. i want to make him pay for his misdeeds. he called me kasi unskilled, untrained and very under qualified. Although he does have better credentials that I do, i developed way better applications than he did. and well basically my applications are all mine, original. i didn't copy, download, or buy it from anybody. there.. payag ba kayo na lait-laitin ang pinoy? galit na galit sya sakin kasi pinoy ako. tapos boss decided to hire me. kaya when i was working under him he made my professional life miserable. now i want payback. and well justice served as well.

     

    looking at it morally, he should pay for deceiving the company. but legally do we have a case? thanks po." by Viola

  9. of course what your professor required is what you must get.

     

    but if you want a supplemental book (other than your text book), i suggest that you get the college edition of oblicon by de leon. why? first, because its simple and concise. second, you will have time to read it, thrid, its cheaper, and lastly, OBLICON is easy to understand. especially if you reach higher law school level .

     

    good day.

     

    PARAS will be our basic reference but i'd rather read something else.

     

    a friend recommends tolentino...what can you say about him?

     

    aside from de leon what else would you recommend?

     

    thanks for the reply dude

  10. Wala 'atang ganun, what I know of are magic notes which are compilation of lectures of well-known law professors like Dean Aligada or Dean Ortega. But usually these are exclusive notes for Fratmen.

     

    I heard that some enterprising law student was able to record review classes of some law professors, I just dont know if its up for sale.

     

    hmmmmmmmmm..........

     

    EXCLUSIVELY for fratmen... i doubt it. i have some up notes, ortega, etc.

     

    pm me your email padalhan kita

  11. Yup, pasok sa unjust vexation. You file the case against the one collecting against you. I assume that would be the collecting agency  HSBC hired. You must get the name of the one persistently calling and bugging you.

     

    so yung tao lang ang pwede mong idemanda hindi yung company?

     

    pano kung iba't ibang tao ang tumatawag saiyo pero from the same company?

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